April, 2004

NEW TRENDS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Abdel-Azim Mahmoud Hanafi

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington in the last week of January brought to an end Ankara’s tense relations with Washington and ushered in a new stage in US-Turkish relations. The period of tension was triggered by the Turkish parliament’s refusal to take part in the US-led war against Iraq and was intensified by the US detention of 11 Turkish soldiers in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya in July 2003.
Since this time, however, Turkey has been keen to help the US, with parliament approving the dispatch of Turkish forces to Iraq and giving permission for more than 60,000 American soldiers to move through the Incirlik airbase, near the border with Syria. This shift in relations stems from both countries’ realisation of their need for each other.
The US considers Turkey a geo-strategic player in the Balkans and the Middle East, as well as a significant geopolitical ally upon which it can rely to attain several strategic objectives. The US needs to maintain a considerable military presence to protect its vital interests in the big oil arch stretching from Central Asia and the Caucasian Sea to the Arab Gulf and thus needs a direct ally to help strengthen its control in the region. The US also sees Turkey, the only secular Muslim democracy in the Middle East, as a barrier to the considerable power of Iran, which it seeks to address. Washington believes that the “tolerant” model of Islam adopted by Turkey could be an effective weapon against the fundamentalist wave of Islam in the region, and that it could help in establishing democracy in Iraq.
American analysts are keen to stress that Turkey’s Islamic heritage has not resulted in hostility towards the Jews nor prevented the development of close relations with Tel Aviv. President George W Bush, meanwhile, is eager to push forward a new non-violent model for the Islamic countries, as crystallised in Turkey.
Ankara, too, has focused on the religious dimension. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul declared in the October 2003 Asian economic forum in Thailand that Islamic society is capable of change and adaptation through modernisation. And, Erdogan, during his visit to Washington, met with the American Jewish Congress, which awarded him a “Profiles in Courage” award in recognition of his efforts to protect the status of Jews in Turkey and his desire to strengthen Turkey’s relations with Israel. In this regard, Erdogan has proposed the establishment of a common industrial zone between Turkey, Israel and the US in the southeastern region of Anatolia.
Turkey is currently in the process of reviewing its regional alliances. During the late 1990s, Ankara signed a strategic alliance with the then Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu, mainly against Syria and Iraq. However, the moderate Justice and Development Party, currently holding the government majority, is seeking to consolidate relations with the Islamic and Arab world while at the same time maintaining its industrial and military ties with Israel. This new policy has brought about a significant improvement in Turkish-Syrian relations, as reflected in Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad’s visit to Turkey in January.
While Ankara insists that Syria acknowledge Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish-held province of Alexandretta and is equally firm on certain other contentious issues, asserting its sovereignty over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, shared concern over the Kurdish issue has brought Turkey, Syria and Iran closer, despite US opposition to such rapprochement. Pentagon hawk Richard Perle warned in June 2003 against any Turkish involvement in actions that might stir up US worries towards Syria and Iran. From the Turkish perspective, though, it is natural that the developments in its neighbour Iraq bring it closer to other Arab countries that share a number of targets, which include:
- maintaining the unity and sovereignty of Iraqi territories
- preventing the eruption of civil war in Iraq as a result of power struggles between its various religious and ethnic groups
- guaranteeing the fair distribution of Iraq’s oil wealth to all Iraqis.
Turkey and Iraq’s other neighbours – Syria, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia – agree that a federal system should be established in Iraq based on the country’s existing 18 provinces rather than a system that divides the country based on ethnicity, which they assert would have bloody consequences. The country’s oil wealth, meanwhile, should be distributed among all citizens, not just among those groups in whose lands the oil is located, such as the Kurds.
Turkey also seeks to coordinate its stances with Egypt, one of the biggest countries of the region in terms of population, economy and military capabilities, and a regional power that enjoys special relations with the US. In light of the new strategic environment imposed on the Middle East by the US invasion of Iraq, President Hosni Mubarak’s visit to Ankara on 11 February is highly significant. Both Ankara and Cairo, along with others in the region, made every effort to prevent the US war on Iraq, and they have sustained their coordination by means of a series of meetings since the US invasion, the last of which was held in Kuwait on 14 February with the aim of seeking to preserve the unity and regional security of Iraq.
Turkey’s relations with Iran, though, remain tense. The Turkish military have accused Iran of opposing Turkey’s secular structure and of harbouring and funding Islamic groups active inside the country. Ankara fears the emergence of Shia powers in Iraq that might adopt pro-Iranian, anti-Turkish stances, and this feeling is nurtured by the greater role the clergy is set to take in ruling Iraq during the coming period. Turkish leaders are concerned that Iran might become the dominant power in Iraq, which would diminish Turkish influence, particularly with Iran seemingly in a better position in this regard due to its strong ties with the country’s Shia majority.
Turkey’s relations with Europe are also a source of some concern in Ankara, with European support for the country’s joining of the EU by no means universal. Solving the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, one of the main themes of those opposed to Turkish membership of the union, is crucial for the Turkish government, and Erdogan has thus been keen to turn this issue to his favour. During his visit to the US, he described the suicide attacks carried out in Turkey in November 2003 as a new start for relations and cooperation between Washington and Ankara as both countries are engaged in a common battle against terrorism. Bush, in return, promised to support unreservedly Turkey’s bid to join the EU.
The EU published a “progress report” on 5 November 2003 in which it noted the political reform achievements of the Justice and Development Party, which it described as significant and crucial, especially in the areas of free expression, freedom to gather and demonstrate, and supervision of military institutions. According to the report, these are highly significant political developments that bring Turkey closer to the values and criteria of the EU. This progress, moreover, albeit slow and limited, will definitely facilitate Turkey’s bid to join the EU when negotiations start in December 2004.
Chief among the developments mentioned in the report is the progress in the Cyprus issue. Athens and Ankara have agreed to a plan proposed by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan on 11 November 2002 for the creation of a united Cypriot republic made up of two equal states, one Greek, one Turkish. Erdogan’s government, with US support, was able to convince Turkey’s National Security Council, despite its initial reservations, to issue a statement, on 23 January 2004, declaring its approval for Annan’s plan as a basis for negotiations.
This shift in position can be attributed to a number of factors:
- Washington’s promise to Ankara that it will take Turkish objections to the Cyprus plan into consideration
- Popular support in Turkish Cyprus to resolve the problem in accordance with Annan’s plan, as reflected in the elections of 14 December 2003
- The desire of the Justice and Development Party government to eliminate one of the biggest obstacles to Turkish membership of the EU
- The expected entry of Greek Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004, which would be awkward for Ankara, compelled to deal with a European country that it does not acknowledge.