April, 2004

OIL AND THE UNITY OF SUDAN

Karim Al-Qadi

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The Sudanese government’s oil policy has stayed more or less the same since the precious commodity was discovered in the south of the country in 1979 by US company Chevron. This policy is based on two major factors: protecting the oil regions from internal conflict and southern armed forces; and exploiting the conflict between the Nuer and Dinka tribes by financing one at the expense of the other in order to maintain a strategic balance in the oil-producing regions.
This strategy has been in place since its introduction by former president Jaafar Al-Numeiri, continued by current president Omar Al-Bashir. Before Numeiri’s term in office, oil extraction had been halted as a result of southern attacks against US companies, which included taking American employees hostage. The current regime worked long and hard to retract Chevron’s licence, eventually succeeding to replace it with East Asian and Canadian companies, which helped to overcome the obstacle of US economic sanctions. This move also helped to provide an atmosphere safe enough to produce enough oil for local use and export purposes.
The government thus provided both military and economic support as Sudanese hopes of exiting the country’s economic crisis were raised.
However, according to data published by Human Rights Watch in 2003, the government spent about half of its oil income on improving its military capabilities, thus allowing it to strengthen its control over the oil-producing regions. Other reports, meanwhile, claim that the government signed deals with Russia, Belarus and Poland to buy weapons, military aircraft and helicopters. Yet as a result of the government’s purchases, its internal negotiating position improved, even in the face of mounting international pressure.
The government also expanded its army to some 100,000 soldiers, increased the Popular Forces of Defence to some 15,000 fighters, and provided the Arab Al-Qarrah tribe of northern Kordofan with weapons to attack certain militant groups. It repeated this tactic with the Nuer tribe, in the Upper Nile province, to help it stand its ground against John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
The government also used its oil proceeds to try to forge allies with certain southern tribes. In 1997, for example, it signed the Khartoum peace agreement with Rick Machar, a Nuer tribe leader who had held a leadership position in the SPLA until he separated from it in 1991 to become chief of the Southern States Coordination Council and leader of the Southern Defence Force. He broke with the government and resigned these posts in 2000 in protest against Khartoum’s support for another Nuer leader, and a conflict ensued between the two, which the central government was able to manipulate to serve its interests in terms of both military action and the negotiations.

The SPLM and wealth-sharing
An initial reading of the wealth-sharing agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 7 January 2004, might give the impression that the interests of the southerners have been better served, especially as they will now have the opportunity to benefit from the oil in their territories.
However, there are various factors to be taken into consideration here. The community structure of the south is tribal and includes a number of ethnically different tribes that live a nomadic lifestyle dependent mainly on livestock.
A major concern stems from the different tribal affiliations of the SPLM and SPLA, on one hand, and all of the other tribes, on the other. The southerners do not form one society but are made up of different tribes, and there is generally some form of conflict with the large Dinka tribe, which is not represented by the SPLM. The movement will thus inevitably find itself in need of support during the next period.
The implementation of the agreement in southern Sudan could thus prove difficult. The agreement stipulates that those communities affected by oil projects will be consulted on industry development, that they have the right to additional relative privileges, that they will be fairly compensated for any land used by projects, and that they have the right to take part in negotiations. Here, SPLA will face a real test of its ability to maintain control as much disputed land is inhabited by the Nuer tribe and its militants. So far, no agreement has been reached, though there are still regular flare-ups over water resources and fields.
The situation in the south will likely remain unstable until the SPLA is able to make progress in unifying its ranks and enlisting the support of the other southern tribes.
Oil: the deciding factor
Oil could be a prime reason for preserving the unity of Sudan for the time being. The current situation in Sudan serves the government as control lies with those who extract, transport, refine and export it, as opposed to those whose land contains it. And as one of the parties to the country’s various oil contracts, the government controls relations with the companies.
The militants’ relations with the SPLA are not so intimate. But the agreement will not be powerful until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached between all parties, which will involve the difficult task of maintaining a delicate status quo.
The SPLM will also need time to forge strong contacts with the various militant leaders in the south in order to achieve legal recognition of Garang’s
leadership. However, there is expected to be much disagreement over wealth distribution and leadership of the southern states. The Nuer tribe has already declared its concern over the specified 2% allocations of oil income to the producing regions. This and other disagreements, meanwhile, will mean the government will play an increasing role as mediator.
The division of Sudan, though, would lead to a stage of regional instability, with neither the government nor the SPLM ready to relinquish their control, and both ready to fight to retain as much as possible. Such a situation would also
affect others in the region, both politically and economically, and will also hamper the work of oil companies, thus raising the possibility of triggering a whole new cycle of violence in the region.