April, 2004

CHANGES IN LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY

Khaled Hanafi Ali

Washington’s decision in February 2004 to lift the Libya travel ban imposed on US citizens was no surprise for many observers, who have been expecting a full return of Libyan-US relations given that the country has passed all the “international tests,” managed to shed its “rogue state” status and yielded to the rules of the US-led world order. However, the US decision was not a snap one, and rather comes as a result of changes that have been taking place in Libyan foreign policy over the past few years.
The Libyan leadership had come to realise that the Lockerbie crisis, the consequent sanctions, and regional and international isolation, not to mention their negative impact on a population under siege, could have spelt the end for the country’s regime, or at the very least jeopardised its legitimacy.
The focus of the new Libyan foreign policy has been to promote Libya as a state enjoying good relations with countries around the world and as a leading player in peacemaking and in the enhancement of political stability on the regional and international levels. The country has worked to fulfil these goals by means of tools that do not run counter to the regulations set by the world order for international actors, for example by working through regional aggregations.
This slowly constructed policy was formed through the successful handling of various issues:
- Libya stopped support for terrorism, announcing it would end its relations with all groups and organisations involved in terrorist actions;
- Libya declared it had no camps for the training or harbouring of terrorists and called on the UN to send an inspection committee to check;
- Libya declared that it would not allow direct or indirect use of its land, citizens or institutions in any terrorist activity and would punish anyone proven to be involved;
- Libya affirmed that it respects the choices of others and that it bases its relations on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs.
In this context, Libya sought to end its territorial crisis with Chad over Aozou, turning to international arbitration, which led to a verdict in 1994 in the favour of Chad. Libya also halted all support to rebels and revolutionary systems in Africa. In order to lessen the impact of the economic boycott against it, meanwhile, Libya worked to improve its relations with Egypt and Tunisia, while relations with Morocco and Sudan were improved by the suspension of backing for the Polisario front and the forces of John Garang, respectively.

A peaceful regional and international role
Libya has sought to play a positive regional and international role in order to change the image that has formed of it in the mind of the international community. It established the Community of the Sahel-Saharan States in 1997, in which it was joined by 18 Arab and African countries. Libyan diplomacy also succeeded in convincing the states of Africa to turn the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union, which, after its launch in 2002, was better equipped to stand up to the challenges of the new world order.
The establishment of the African Union can be seen as a major post-Cold War victory for Libyan diplomacy and for the country’s leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi. These efforts had a positive impact across the continent, and in the 1998 OAU summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, sanctions against Libya were lifted. This urged Qaddafi later on to react to the Arab countries’ lack of support for him in the Lockerbie crisis by submitting a request for Libya’s withdrawal from the Arab League.
Libya has also made efforts to gain the respect of international public opinion by its mediation in various international crises, such as the Filipino Abu Siaf group’s kidnap of westerners, and has assumed a role in the solving of several problems in Africa, such as in Sudan, Sierra Leone and Congo. In this regard, Qaddafi’s website (www.algathafi.org) contains the leader’s vision for a more peaceful and secure world. Here, Qaddafi promotes the peaceful solving of world crises, offering his advice for the resolution of the North Korean crisis and means of dealing with terrorism.

The Arab-Israeli crisis
Libya has traditionally taken an anti-Israeli stance, and has previously suggested that the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a combined Arab attack on Israel to liberate all occupied Arab territories. Tripoli, accordingly, used to oppose any Israeli involvement in Africa, which it likened to western imperialism.
Tripoli’s new approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict is quite different. Qaddafi’s current vision for the settlement of the crisis, as detailed in his White Book, is based on the establishment of a new state, “Isratine,” in which Palestinians and Israelis would live in peace. This state would have free elections, supervised by the UN, and would be free of weapons of mass destruction. As for some of the more difficult issues, Qaddafi supports the right of return for Palestinian refugees and proposes the internationalisation of Jerusalem, as a special city for many religions, as well as its membership of the Arab League.
This initiative is based on the legitimacy of various international resolutions and agreements. The right of return of refugees, for example, was stipulated in Security Council resolution 191, while the internationalisation of Jerusalem was recommended by the UN’s famous resolution on the division of Palestine.
This post-Cold War shift in Libya’s policy towards Israel was perhaps no more apparent than during the first 5+5 Euro-Mediterranean dialogue summit, held in Tunisia in December 2003 between five countries from Arab North Africa and five from Europe. Here, Qaddafi told a reporter from Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot “There is no place for weapons in the world of today” and “I take no stances against the United States or the Jews.”
In January 2004, there were rumours of a meeting in Greece between Qaddafi’s son, Seif Al-Islam Al-Qaddafi, and Israeli officials. Although Libya denied this, Seif Al-Islam said in a statement published on the Al-Jazeera website on 8 January that Libya no longer considered Israel a threat to its security, nor did it consider itself to be in confrontation with Israel. He also talked about a change in the stance of the Palestinians themselves, referring to Yasser Arafat’s declaration that he wants no war and to the Palestinian’s preference for a non-military solution.

Relations with the West
Libya’s recent flexible approach to the issue of the Lockerbie crisis saw it turn to international arbitration in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in accordance with the 1971 Montreal agreement that renders the court responsible for the settlement of legal disputes between states. On 6 April 1999, following the court’s examination of the case, Libya handed over those suspected of responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 to appear before a Scottish court held in The Hague. Tripoli’s management of the crisis not only guaranteed it Arab and African support but was also the key to a new stage of relations between itself and the West. This action led to the suspension of sanctions against the country.
In October 2002, Libya agreed to pay $10m in compensation to the family of each victim, adding up to a total of $2.7bn. According to the agreement, this compensation is payable in three instalments, with the total to be deposited in a special account for eight months during which time sanctions are to be lifted or the agreement considered void. The first instalment, of $4m per family, was set to be paid after Libya’s declaration of its responsibility; the second, also $4m for each family, when the US agrees to lift trade sanctions against Libya; and the last instalment, of $2m, when the US agrees to remove Libya from its list of countries that harbour terrorism.
In a message delivered to the Security Council on 15 August 2003, Libya admitted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. The following day, the US declared that it had no objection to the Security Council lifting its sanctions on Libya, and these were removed on 12 September 2003.
Tripoli has also started to improve its relations with the countries of Europe, as manifested in its involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue of the 5+5 group.
A political and security deal secured the resumption of relations with Britain, with Libya claiming responsibility for the murder of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, who was shot outside the Libyan embassy in London on 17 April 1984, and agreeing to pay £250,000 in compensation to her family. Libyan-French relations, meanwhile, were improved by Tripoli’s payment of $34m compensation to the victims of a UTA plane blown up over Niger in 1989. The six Libyans suspected of carrying out the attack included a relative of Qaddafi. On 9 January 2004, Libya agreed to increase this compensation to $170m.
Libyan-European rapprochement thus far has led to an increase in oil trade between the two sides and the creation of investment opportunities in Libya.

Relations with the US
Libya has made continued efforts to improve its tense relations with the US since announcing its support for Washington’s anti-terrorism policy following the events of 11 September 2001. In an interview with Newsweek magazine on 13 January 2003, for example, Qaddafi affirmed that there was security cooperation between Tripoli and Washington to eradicate the Al-Qaeda group. Libya also adopted a cautious stance vis-à-vis the US war on Iraq, sufficing with general warnings against the regional chaos the war could cause and calling for mediation between the US and Iraqi presidents.
Over the course of this period, Qaddafi has repeatedly said that his conflict with the US is over and expressed his desire to resume relations with Washington. In an interview with Time magazine on 10 August 2003, Qaddafi declared: “We have no interest in being hostile against a superpower like America. We wish to have good relations because we will benefit from that. To be at loggerheads with America, we shall lose.”
Despite the long history of animosity between Libya and the US, Washington rewarded Tripoli for its efforts by not including it in President George W Bush’s “axis of evil,” along with Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein and North Korea.
However, the US linked the resumption of relations with Libya to reform of the country’s political system and destruction of its weapons of mass destruction, as stated in a White House statement on 15 September 2003, which, while approving of the lifting of international sanctions, made it clear that Washington’s own sanctions would remain in place. Washington’s two demands were repeated in the secretary of state’s reports in 2001, 2002 and 2003, although these acknowledged Tripoli’s efforts, particularly in ending support for terrorist groups.
The announcement by Libya’s ministry of foreign affairs on 19 December 2003 that the country would eliminate its weapons of mass destruction shows how serious it is to remove any obstacles to the restoration of its relations with Washington. This was followed by the US National Security Council announcing on 26 February 2004 the lifting of travel restrictions to Libya for US citizens. The Security Council decision, described by a spokesman as a show of appreciation and acknowledgement of Libya’s tangible steps in the area of eliminating its weapons of mass destruction, also has considerable implications for Libya in terms of economic growth, as it allows US companies to re-enter the country alongside their European counterparts.

Weapons of mass destruction
Libya’s decision to surrender any internationally banned weapons of mass destruction can be seen as part of a greater shift in the country’s behaviour. The Libyan ministry of foreign affairs noted at the time that the disarmament decision was the outcome of several meetings with experts from Britain and the US. It backed up its position with assertions that the arms race does not serve its security nor that of the region but rather contradicts its desire to live in a peaceful and secure world, and also called for others to follow in its footsteps, starting with the Middle East region, with no exceptions.
This decision has spared the country the pressure that would have been exerted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US. Earlier US declarations that the suspected ownership of nuclear weapons by Iraq was one of the main reasons for the US invasion of this country were also a significant factor in Libya’s decision, as Qaddafi himself acknowledged in an interview with CNN on 22 December 2003.
Within the framework of Libya’s new foreign policy comes a revised approach to the use of non-conventional military power, which Tripoli had previously used intensively to achieve its objectives abroad. During a visit to Mali two days before the US invasion of Iraq, Qaddafi announced a universal opposition to weapons of mass destruction and called for all countries to eliminate them, starting with the US. The Libyan leader has also said that his country will play an international role in creating a world free of weapons of mass destruction.

At home
On the domestic level, Libya has begun efforts to free up its economy in order to attract a ready stream of western investment into the local market, and there is now a cautious openness towards the previously restricted private sector. The government devaluation of the dinar in 2002 aimed to liberate the national economy, attract more foreign investment and rationalise the use of hard currency reserves. In a public conference on 13 June 2003, Qaddafi called for the privatisation of the public sector, including in oil and banking, and for the application of popular capitalism as represented by companies owned by Libyans, which have the right to use the expertise of foreign experts.
Libya is also looking at internal political reform, on the basis that it cannot combine a foreign policy open to the international capitalist system with a domestic political system based on post-Cold War revolutionism. Just how far Libya is prepared to go in terms of reforming its internal affairs, however, remains to be seen.