July, 2003

The New U.S. Strategy in Africa

Khaled Hanafi Ali

Of prime concern to analysts of African affairs is the position of Africa within the US strategy for world hegemony. Has the US already begun measures to implement this strategy in the continent and, if so, what are their consequences? The answers to these questions will affect the future of the continent's more than 700m inhabitants.

Africa is possibly more important within the framework of the new US strategy than other regions, such as the Middle East, Asia and Europe, for a number of reasons:

1- Africa's important trade routes and ports in both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, through which the US could expand its military presence worldwide.

2- Africa's mineral and oil wealth, which represents a good opportunity for the US, which considers the fulfilment of its oil needs a matter of national security.

3- Africa's market of around 700m people, which the US wants to benefit from, particularly as trade between it and Africa is relatively low.

In this context, the Republican administration of George W Bush has taken serious steps to apply its imperialist strategy in Africa. One of the main steps it has taken is to intensify the US military presence in the continent. In the Horn of Africa region, the US made considerable efforts in this regard. US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti in December 2002, guaranteeing that these countries would allow US aircraft to use their airspace, provide the US with military information and allow its navy to move freely to maintain Red Sea security from the Horn of Africa side.

Eritrea agreed to let the US use the port of Asab, Ethiopia joined with the US to fight terrorist groups, while Djibouti, which allowed the US access to port and airport facilities, is home to around 1,300 US soldiers, stationed in a former French Foreign Legion base, Camp Lemonier. US forces held manoeuvres in Djibouti by way of training for Iraq and established a region-wide air and sea monitoring system to prevent the flow of Al-Qaeda elements to the Yemeni, Somali or Kenyan coasts.

Maintaining a military presence in Africa allows the US to carry out important missions. US forces were able, for example, to kill six suspected members of Al-Qaeda in Yemen by means of a missile launched by an unmanned plane sent from Djibouti, controlled directly from the CIA headquarters in Virginia.

The US also intends to deploy forces in other areas of Africa. General James Jones, supreme allied commander for Europe and commander of the US European Command, said in April 2003 that the US seeks to enhance its military presence in Africa to respond to new threats represented in some unstable countries and large regions not under direct control, which leave room for drug trafficking and the training of terrorists.

Jones, the leader of US forces in a region comprising 93 countries in Europe and Africa, added that at a time when the challenges in Africa are increasing for the US and Nato, US aircraft carriers, other vessels and forces would not stay in the Mediterranean for more than six months, instead serving off the western coast of Africa. He added that the US defence department intends to establish strategic centres worldwide for quick intervention in the framework of enhancing the quick deployment of US forces and managing their financial resources more efficiently.

There can be no doubt here that the presence of US forces off Africa's western coast is partly to secure the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, which will pump 250,000 barrels of oil a day to the Atlantic.

Movements towards African oil:

1- The US administration has started working to prevent and end ethnic conflict in the oil-producing regions of Africa. It is no coincidence that complicated, decades-long conflicts are being resolved, such as the conflict in Angola between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola -Unita- and the government, which ended in April 2002. An agreement for the Great Lakes region was also reached and, at the beginning of 2002, the US sponsored peace negotiations in Sudan.

2- US political visits to Africa have been intensified over the last year. In 2002, US foreign secretary Colin Powell made the first visit for someone in his position to Gabon. General Carlton Fulford, deputy commander of the US European Command, paid a similar visit to Sao Tome and Principe in July 2002 to discuss the security of oilfield workers in the Gulf of Guinea, and to increase the possibility of establishing a branch of the US military, similar to the one in South Korea. It is expected that Bush will visit Senegal on 7-8 July 2003.

3- The African Oil Policy Initiative Group was formed comprising representatives of the US administration and private sector companies. The group issued a paper titled 'African Oil: A Priority for US National Security and African Development.' The paper calls on the US administration to take serious measures to secure its oil interests in Africa, including enhancing US customs facilities for African products, and proposes a US pledge to write off African debts.

This group has become the US lobby that operates in Africa to secure oil interests, the same group that put pressure on Nigeria to leave Opec.
4- The US overlooks the corruption of some ruling systems in Africa's oil-producing countries. Equatorial Guinea, for example, although considered by the US a violator of human rights, can look forward to the reopening of the US embassy there thanks to oil reserves of 2bn barrels.

The expected oil discoveries in Kenya have urged large US oil companies, including ExxonMobil and Chevron, to open branches in the strategic Gulf of Guinea in recent years. This year, US oil companies are expected to invest around $10bn in Africa.

African alliances against terrorism:

The US initiative to fight terrorism started only three days after the events of 11 September 2001. On 14 September, the US assistant foreign secretary for African affairs held a meeting for the envoys of most African embassies in Washington, during which he called for their support in the war on terrorism by means of cooperating with the CIA and providing all required information and facilitation to US intelligence missions.

At the same time, the US administration increased its meetings with African leaders. On 13 September 2002, Bush invited 10 African leaders for a breakfast gathering, securing their promises to back the US campaign against terrorism. The link between this campaign and other US aims, related to oil interests and the intensification of military deployment, explains the motives for increased US interest in Africa.

The expected difficulties:

The road ahead for the US in terms of implementing its strategy in Africa will be far from easy. For a start, there are other international powers with their eyes on the continent's considerable natural wealth. France, which has influence in 20 francophone states in Africa, has already begun to amend its waning policy in the continent, and is increasing its aid to African countries by more than 0.7% of its GNP without any linkage to the issue of democracy. It seems that the war on Iraq, which was rejected by France, served as a reminder to Paris of the need to intensify its cooperation with Africa lest it find itself left out in the cold, as it was in the Middle East.

Within Africa itself a number of crises have helped create an unstable environment. Foreign debts stood at $600bn at the end of 1998, representing 44% of African GNP and around 227% of total African export revenue. Debt servicing has curbed all development programmes in the region and enhanced poverty and poor health. Political and ethnic conflicts, meanwhile, are still ravaging the continent, while anti-American feeling, as expressed in many demonstrations against the US war on Iraq, will be a clear impediment to the US.

The countries of Africa must now form a united vision to counter the new US strategy in the continent. Such a vision must be based on joint cooperation that is beneficial to both sides, rather than dividing the spoils between several beneficiaries excluding, of course, the rightful owners.