July, 2003

U.S.-Turkish Relations

Abdel-Azim Mahmoud Hanafi

Tension between the US and Turkey during and after the Iraq war is the result of a number of factors. Ankara has been involved in Iraqi affairs since the Gulf War in 1991, even if it was unable to bring about the settlement to the Iraqi crisis that it so wanted to find. Within Turkey's political circles, meanwhile, there was an increasing desire to end the siege on Iraq due to it no longer being considered a threat to the regional balance.

The Turkish parliament's refusal to let allied forces use Turkish territory to enter Iraq from the north caused considerable tension between Ankara and Washington. Although many were convinced that this refusal would set back the progress of the campaign, the US was able to compensate by means of complicated logistics, and with the cooperation of the Kurds.

The change in Turkey's stance towards participation in the invasion was influenced by various domestic considerations. By the summer of 2002, the Turkish General Staff had realised that the US-led military campaign was inevitable and that Turkey was bound to participate. The General Staff therefore planned to dispatch forces to the north of Iraq to secure the US forces on their advance to Baghdad. This step was also intended to guarantee that after the removal of Saddam Hussein, Turkey would have a military presence in northern Iraq to prevent the Iraqi Kurds from establishing an independent political entity or a Kurdish state there. Turkey's General Staff, however, deferred giving any commitment to the US in order to guarantee concessions from Washington, including aid and military equipment, and to obtain a commitment that Iraq would remain a united state after the regime change.

The victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey's 2002 elections complicated matters for the General Staff, which had declared that the final decision on the country's participation in the war would be taken by the civil government. The government then manoeuvred to defer any decision with the aim of obtaining further concessions from the US in order to placate an angry public.

A crucial factor for Turkey was its worry over the status of the Kurds in Iraq, and the effect any change would have on its own Kurdish minority. Turkey, which declared before the war that it would not allow the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, therefore made every effort to assert its influence in the region, stationing 10,000 soldiers on its borders with Iraq and sending military supervisors to accompany the US forces in Kirkuk.

Turkey was convinced that the US would attain an overwhelming victory, and hoped that the collapse of Iraq's central authority would encourage the Kurds to head to the south of the country to fill the power vacuum there. Turkey's worst apprehensions seemed to be coming true, though, when Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani's peshmerga forces invaded Kirkuk. Despite US promises not to allow the establishment of a Kurdish state or even to let the Kurds make a play for independence, Turkey could not rely on these promises. In the north of Iraq, remnants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party -PKK- were involved in a vicious war against Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. The situation worsened when Saddam Hussein lost control over the north of Iraq after the Gulf War, and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict continued, claiming the lives of around 30,000 people, mainly Kurds. Millions of Kurds were also displaced from their towns and cities in the south east of Turkey, in an attempt by the government to stop them assisting the PKK in this region. This period witnessed many human rights violations.

In light of these considerations, the Turkish government allowed the Americans to use Turkish airspace. However, nearly half the country's members of parliament voted against the deployment of 62,000 US soldiers; only four votes short of a majority. Turkey then continued its efforts to secure its strategic interests through a number of measures:

- Trying to use Iraq's Turkmen minority to prevent the Kurds from establishing a separate state by endeavouring to give the Turkmen similar rights to those of the Kurds. If the Kurds were given autonomy, then the Turkmen would have the same right. This means that a trained Turkmen militia will handle security in their region.

- Reviewing a number of old international agreements to ascertain if it has any rights in the oilfields of northern Iraq and, if so, to attain the acknowledgement of the international community of these rights in the framework of its desire to secure its interests and those of the Turkmen minority in northern Iraq.

- Opening channels of communication with Iran and Syria. Although the Turkish General Staff sees Iran as an enemy to secularism and accuses it of training and financing Islamic groups inside Turkey, Ankara believes it has common interests with both Iran and Syria with regard to the Kurdish issue, all three countries having Kurdish minorities. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul recently visited Syria and the Iranian vice president has also visited Turkey, which has increased concern over the possibility of US-Turkish relations deteriorating, especially given the Islamic orientation of the ruling Justice and Development Party.

For now, both the US and Turkey are working to overcome the differences between them, and there are some signs of rapprochement, chief among which is Turkey's acceptance to dispatch peacekeeping forces to Iraq, though it objects to shouldering the related costs.
The US needs Turkey more than ever to play a role in Europe, the Middle East and Afghanistan. Turkey has cooperated previously with the US in the republics of Central Asia, with the two deciding to extend an oil pipeline from oil sources in the Azerbaijani area of the Caspian Sea through Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, thus bypassing Russia and Iran. Pumping is scheduled to start in 2005.

Turkey, meanwhile, needs US help to end its economic crisis, and to assist it in its efforts to join the EU. With many in Europe set against Turkey's entrance to the union, US pressure could serve to strengthen Ankara's position in the deciding talks in 2005.
Some analysts predict that US-Turkish relations will be strained by the issue of northern Iraq, especially with the Kurds' power far superior to that of the Turkmen of the area.

While this is leading to increasing Turkish distrust of Washington's promises, the strength of the relationship is being questioned from the other side too. Within the US administration, Congress and in the public at large, many Americans now believe that Turkey can no longer be trusted, and that it is, therefore, no longer an ally. This image has to be changed by Turkish officials if Turkey is to resume its close relationship with the US, especially as the US will, in all likelihood, ask for Turkish support against Iran and Syria in the not too distant future. Washington expects Ankara to follow a policy congruent with its own with regard to both these countries. Should the US decide to take action against Syria or Iran, the Turkish government would face difficulties related to maintaining the regional balance of power, and Ankara would most probably find itself once again unsure of which way to turn.