July, 2003

The Future of the Shia in Post-Saddam Iraq

Salah Nasrawi

The period preceding the allied invasion of Iraq witnessed the appearance of differences among Iraqi Shia groups. While the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -Sciri- supported the idea of war and coordinated with the US, others condemned such cooperation. Some Shia leaders issued fatwas outlawing cooperation with the invading forces. Others, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Al-Shirazi, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Task Organisation, refrained from supporting the war, but saw it as a chance that must be seized to save the oppressed Iraqi people.

With the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Shia leaders in exile began to return to Iraq. Al-Sayyed Abdel-Mejid Al-Khoei - son of Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim Al-Khoei, spiritual leader at the time of the 1991 Shia uprising - returned even before the fall of the regime. He was moved into Najaf with a small number of his associates by US forces. Al-Khoei's murder on 10 April 2003, in a clash with rival Shia forces, revealed that the realities on the ground are quite different from those anticipated by either the US or Shia leaders in exile. The murder was attributed to Shia followers of the late spiritual leader Muhammad Sadeq Al-Sadr - allegedly assassinated by Saddam Hussein's forces in 1999 - whose movement appears to have a large following in most Shia cities.

There are now four religious-political trends competing for the leadership of the Shia population:

- The first trend emerges from the scholarly Hawza in Najaf, the supreme Shia religious authority. At its head is Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayyed Ali Al-Sistani, followed by ayatollahs Mohammad Ishaq, Fayyad, Hussein Bashir Al-Afghani and Mohammad Said Al-Hakim. Although this group enjoys reverence and respect from most Iraqi Shia, there are doubts as to its ability to politically mobilise the population, both because of its political interpretations regarding the Islamic state, and because Al-Hakim is the only Iraqi in this group.

- The second trend is the followers of Al-Sadr. This group demonstrated a great ability to mobilise by assuming control of the largest Shia concentration in Iraq - an area on the eastern edge of Baghdad which comprises more than 2m Shia inhabitants who have renamed Saddam City, as it was known before the fall of the regime, Al-Sadr City. They also took initiative in other Shia neighbourhoods and cities, establishing militias to maintain order after the disintegration of authority, thereby making a strong bid to lead the Shia forces. This trend draws on a rich heritage of political and religious thought created by the late Al-Sadr, and its bid is strengthened by its strongly Arab stance, which gives it credibility as opposed to organisations with links to Iran. Moreover, followers can genuinely claim to have resisted the former regime while others remained silent or moved out of Iraq.

- The third trend comprises political parties and organised movements, such as the Islamic Dawa Party, the Islamic Task Organisation and other small factions. These groups are burdened with internal divisions and external links established in exile, and their members have not been involved in action on the ground in Iraq since the 1970s and 1980s. They will now have to meet the challenge of operating in a very different environment and demonstrate their ability to provide solutions to political, economic and social problems through the mechanism of covert political action.

- The fourth trend is represented by Sciri. The leader of this organisation, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Al-Hakim, enjoys great popularity as a result of his involvement in the efforts to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime as well as the history of his family. His father held the position of head of the religious leadership in Najaf before Al-Khoei. This organisation has received great media attention, partly because of its considerable support from Iran.

Al-Hakim received a warm welcome on his return to Iraq, but it was nowhere near the reception Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini received on his return to Tehran. The inability of the council's activists to marshal support in some Shia districts reveals that it has a smaller following on the ground than was anticipated, which weakens Al-Hakim's claim to speak in the name of all Shia. Moreover, the council is heavily dependent on Al-Hakim's leadership and has a weak organisational structure and no clear political programme. The council is also discredited by its association with the US, which appears to have used it as a legitimising cover for its invasion and then discarded it, announcing clearly that any form of Islamic government is not an option in Iraq's future.

Al-Hakim has tried to dampen general fears in Iraq regarding the role of the faqih -religious scholar- in providing administrative as well as religious leadership, arguing that the Iraqi people should decide on their form of government and must participate in the making of political and social decisions. He proclaimed his commitment to civil society, political diversity and free elections. There are, however, indications of difference of opinion regarding Islamic government between Al-Hakim and the religious leadership in Najaf, especially Al-Sistani, who takes a more moderate position on the role of the faqih. Al-Sistani enjoys wide respect among Iraqi Shia, and although he appears to support Al-Hakim so far, it is not yet clear how this relationship will hold up. Sciri will also be under pressure in the days to come to assert its national identity and its independence from the influence of Iran.

In focusing on Shia political movements we must not overlook the fact that the majority of Iraqi Shia do not belong to any of these organisations, and many have nationalist, liberal or leftist affiliations. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime provides the Shia with an important opportunity to play a political, social and economic role consistent with their size and importance. In order to do this, the Shia must successfully meet a number of challenges. Shia political thought must now respond to the question of what is the form and nature of the political state, and develop a political programme.

The Shia must overcome their internal divisions to appear as a unified force on the domestic scene and translate their numerical majority into political influence. They must achieve a balance between their Arab national identity and their links to Iran. They must also deal with the reservations of the other, predominantly Sunni, Arab countries concerning a potential Shia regime in Iraq.

Despite the continuing growth of the Shia's power, they have never expressed any separatist intentions, nor are there any economic, geographical or cultural justifications for such a move. On the contrary, the Shia tend to view themselves as the embodiment of Iraq. It remains to be seen, though, if they will finally be successful in winning their fair share of wealth and political power in the new Iraq.