April, 2003

North Korea: Management of a Nuclear Crisis

Nazira Al-Effendi

Developments in North Korea and Iraq since the events of 11 September 2001, and more so since the start of the US-British invasion of Iraq, highlight the new rules of the game in the current world order, which are not the same as those that existed during the Gulf War in 1991. The events leading up to this crisis have been of a different nature, as have their consequences in terms of North/South Korea relations and their respective relationships with the US.

The US imposed its international hegemony in 1990 by kidnapping Panamanian president Gen. Manuel Noriega from inside the Nicaraguan embassy in the heart of the capital of his country and took him in shackles to the US, disregarding all international laws. This hegemony was further consolidated in the wake of the Gulf War in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and finally in Afghanistan, although these actions took place within the framework of international legitimacy or at least with some international support.

The developments of the few past months, however, have shown that the US no longer has absolute right of movement in the international arena. Even if the US remains the world's first military power, it still needs the umbrella of an international coalition, even if such support is confined to for example Denmark and Australia.

The restraints on US world domination have had several manifestations. This was reflected in the firm refusal of France and Germany to back the passing of a new Security Council resolution allowing for the use of military power against Iraq. Another of these constraints has been the level of Iraqi resistance to the allied invasion, which had been underestimated and which necessitated the deployment of larger numbers of allied troops. The resistance to 'dollar diplomacy' by certain African and Latin American friends of the US also reflected this change, as did the stances of Nigeria, Mexico and Chile vis-à-vis US attempts to mobilise support for the war in the Security Council.

In Turkey, too, things did not go as the US had hoped, despite Washington's pledge to provide Turkey with NATO security cover and its support for Ankara's bid to join the European Union. In the end, Turkey's national interests, its political balance and the public's overwhelming anti-war stand held more sway over the government's decisions on whether or not to allow US planes access to Turkish airspace and bases for the purpose of deploying troops in northern Iraq. Another factor that affected Turkey's decision was its fear of the effect the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq would have on its own Kurdish minority.

Turkey's stand was firm despite a visit by US secretary of state Colin Powell to Ankara, his meeting with his European counterparts in Brussels, and Washington's previous attempts to win over the leaders of the Turkish army, ignoring totally the concepts of democracy and civil rule.


Constraints on US power in East Asia:

The leadership of South Korea has experienced deep divisions over supporting the war on Iraq despite the general anti-US stand of the public and its stand against the war on Iraq in particular.

Seoul had previously declared its desire to review the agreement that governs its military relationship with Washington and the US presence on its land, with the aim of turning this relation into one of partnership rather than dependence. The current president, Roh Moo-hyun, has also stressed his commitment to the policy of reconciliation and reunification of North and South Korea.

The South Korean public blames US policy for the negative developments and the deterioration witnessed in the Korean peninsula. Many even consider Washington a more dangerous threat than Pyongyang, to the extent that they welcome a nuclear power in North Korea as a deterrent against hostility.

A similar split exists in Japan's leadership. While military circles in Japan, led by the minister of defence, are in favour of developing a spy satellite programme and have moved towards declaring Tokyo's intention to develop its attack capabilities, the Japanese prime minister denied this intention and reiterated his focus on peaceful settlement of the nuclear crisis with North Korea. This stance corresponds with the historic visit that he paid to Pyongyang and the joint communiqué issued indicating the existence of a framework for understanding between the two countries. These stances boost rather than restrict the stand of Pyongyang.

China is the primary power that determines the movement of the US with regard to a military confrontation with North Korea. This can be attributed to the common wars faced by the two countries as well as the increasing political and economic relations between China and the southern portion of the Korean peninsula since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul in 1992.

China's position on the Korean crisis reflects that it regards the Korean peninsula as its own back yard. The stronger co-dependence between China and the two Koreas becomes, the stronger the strategic role of China is in the area. This leaves little room for China's toleration of the use of military force by the US against North Korea.

Finally, the US must take into consideration the significant military strength of North Korea, and the cost in human lives and of the millions who would be displaced as the result of military action.