April, 2003

The Second Sharon Government: An Ambiguous Programme

Abdel-Alim Mohammed

In a speech before the Knesset on 27 February 2003, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon introduced his new government, composed of 23 ministers and himself. The Likud Party has 14 ministers, the Shinui Party five and the National Religious and National Unity parties two each.

Likud took the key ministries of foreign affairs, finance, internal security and defence in addition to other influential positions in the government. This means that the vital areas of foreign policy, security and defence are still controlled by Sharon, allowing him a greater say in matters relating to the Palestinians, the intifada and the features of the possible Israeli-Palestinian settlement. With the exception of the ministry of interior, members of the Shinui, Mefdal and National Unity parties took the prime positions in the ministries that handle internal affairs, such as labour, science, environment and housing, as well as some others.

This distribution of authority reflects Sharon's desire to limit the influence of the other parties on security, military and Palestinian issues. Mefdal endorses a policy of settlement and therefore aims to protect and defend the existence of settlements. It is worth mentioning in this regard that any deal with the Palestinians might require the closure of settlements. The National Unity Party, meanwhile, opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and has expressed its objection to the relevant items in the government plan.

In introducing the policy of his government, Sharon focused on economic matters, only discussing the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute in unclear terms and without clarification, thus giving himself room to manoeuvre and maintain the cohesion of the coalition. Sharon spoke about 'painful concessions,' without identifying their nature or limits. Such vague language does not restrict his government, nor does it specify any definite commitments on his part before his electorate and the international community. Sharon's rhetoric is open to interpretation by each party, allowing him to move in line with international developments and to counter European and US pressure.

The policy of the new government mirrors Sharon's plan to impose a fait accompli on the Palestinians in which they would have to content themselves with self-rule authority over only half of the West Bank, which they could call, according to the 'road map,' an interim government. And this is still conditional upon their ability to stop the intifada and decrease resistance. This is backed by international guarantees for Israel from the quartet committee and the US.

This government might respond to the international efforts, especially the US ones, that aim to soothe the crisis in order to pave the way for the reform of the Palestinian Authority. Yet the negotiations to crystallise a political solution to the Palestinian issue will still be subject to Sharon's vision of disarming the Palestinians, bringing their resistance to an end and destroying their infrastructure, in return for a disarmed Palestinian state with limited powers. This state might enjoy some features of symbolic sovereignty though if US backing for the establishment of two states proves to be credible.

The destiny of the new government is partly governed by the desire of the Labour Party, led by Amram Mitzna, to stay in opposition and to maintain its unity and political identity. The Labour Party will constructively oppose Sharon's policy, especially if it is able to strengthen the 'peace camp' and bring back to the fold those who, perhaps out of a desire for revenge on the Palestinians, have come to sympathise with the right wing. Labour needs to work on getting its message across and to make clear the link between Israeli security and Palestinian security.

Sharon might in the future find himself obliged to close the rifts in his coalition resulting from the ideological contradictions in its make-up. This might bring about the fall of the government without necessarily the fall of Sharon.

Sharon could make use of the US war against Iraq to push through his concepts for peace with the Palestinians. For the time being, though, the Israeli government has chosen to wait, with Washington firmly focused on Iraq and the Arab and Islamic world. In return for waiting, Israel hopes to realise a solution in its favour under the umbrella of US and international assistance, likely coupled with Palestinian acceptance as a result of the imbalance that will no doubt reign in the region after the war, with the Arab world unable to react firmly.

For Israel, the settlement of the Palestinian issue is not as important as the way it is settled. Israel wants to portray itself to the world as an advocator of peace, and therefore pushes for international assistance in the settlement process. Yet while acquiring international guarantees for itself, Israel is trying to force its own terms on the Palestinians - which would have the Palestinians concede their right of return and forego Jerusalem as their capital.