April, 2003

The Baath Party and the U.S. war on iraq

Seif Nasrawi

The Arab Baath Socialist Party was first established in Damascus in the 1940s, and was one of the various political forces revolting against the 'liberal' regimes established by British and French colonial powers in Syria and Iraq. The ideas of the party quickly moved to Iraq, to some mostly lower middle class Sunni and Shia young men. The Baathist ideology did not spread widely in Iraqi society, however, partly because of the strong links between Arabism and Islam in the cultural and political heritage of most Shia; and due to the strong competition from the Iraqi Communist Party, which had support among the Shia as well as the various religious and ethnic minorities.

In view of their small following and weak organisation, the Baathist leadership soon turned to the idea of military coups d'état as a suitable means to reach power. The Baathists allied themselves with certain military factions and succeeded in toppling Abdel-Karim Qassem's regime in February 1963. Their principal ally, Sunni officer Abdel-Salam Aref, was soon able to rid himself of the Baath Party and seized power for himself. This brought home to the Baath leadership the danger of depending on the military in helping them seize power.

The Baath Party quickly began to reorganise, depending on civilians to assume leadership positions and physically remove all elements of opposition. Blood as well as tribal and regional ties played an important role in strengthening this leadership, the influence of Sunnis and Tikritis in particular becoming overwhelming in upper party echelons.

The Baath Party was able to seize power once more on 17 July 1968. The Sunni Tikritis, through their control of the Baathist revolutionary leadership council, were able to spread their control into practically all aspects of civil society as well as the army, police, judiciary and government. In 1979, Saddam Hussein became Iraq's fifth president, and took this policy to its logical conclusions, giving his family, friends and relations control over party, army and security organisations to ensure the continuation of his hold on power.

Under Saddam Hussein's leadership, the Baath Party and the Baathist state became predominantly Sunni. Discrimination against the Shia in Iraq has existed since the British installed a Sunni king in the 1920s, who gathered around him a Sunni elite. In 37 years of monarchy, only four Shia prime ministers came to power, as opposed to 19 Sunnis. The favouring of Sunnis became more marked under Baath rule due to its wide recruitment of army officers, who are mostly Sunni, as well as the idea prevalent among some Sunni pan-Arabists that the Shia are outsiders, not properly Arab. Many Shia religious leaderships, moreover, took an isolationist and apathetic stance towards politics in Iraq.

Discrimination against the Shia took many forms, including the imposition of a Sunni interpretation of the history of Iraq, the Arabs and Muslims to be taught in schools; restriction of Shia religious celebrations and expressions; lack of development of the infrastructure in predominantly Shia areas; and stifling Shia political organisation as well as career opportunities.

More than half a million Shia and Kurdish Iraqi citizens were forcibly relocated in the second half of the 1970s, labeled as a 'fifth column,' and more than 60,000 killed in the popular uprising in 1991, following the Gulf War. The Iraqi Kurds in the north were able to impose an agreement allowing them political and cultural rights through continued armed resistance. The self-rule agreement was signed between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Democratic Party in March 1970. The government soon reneged on its terms once the shah of Iran, in 1975, withdrew his military support to the Kurds. The Iraqi regime continued to wage war against the Kurds, killing thousands and destroying hundreds of Kurdish villages. -Kurdish areas in the north of Iraq came under international protection following the Gulf War-.

The future of the Baath Party:

Short-term scenarios:

There are numerous plans, ideas and proposals in circulation concerning the post-Saddam Iraqi political system. From our point of view, the future of the Baath Party will be determined according to one of the following scenarios: 1- a total purging of Baathist elements from all political and social organisations, 2- destruction of the party structure while integrating some of its members in the new regime, 3- the maintenance of the party in power while undertaking a radical re-make of its ideology and structure, and 4- maintenance of the party in its present form.

In order to assess the likelihood of any one of these scenarios, it is important to understand certain developments taking place in the current allied-Iraqi conflict. In the early days of the conflict, the allies, as well as western and Arab observers, were surprised by the level of resistance displayed by Baath Party militias and Fedayeen Saddam units. It is important to understand the reason behind this resistance, despite the overwhelming and determined onslaught of the allied forces. In my opinion, this resistance is linked to the deliberate adoption by the Baath of the widespread use of violence against any opposition.

This violence has not been perpetrated by security forces alone; Baath Party members on various levels have been forced to execute the regime's opponents, both from within and outside the party. This policy assumed horrific proportions when party members were forced to publicly execute those fleeing military service. To further instill this atmosphere of terror, the regime widely circulated documentary films on the summary trials and executions of leading regime and Baath figures such as Mohamed Ayesh and his fellow 'conspirators,' executed in August 1979. Similar filmed documentation of the torture and murder of those taking part in the Shia and Kurdish revolt of 1991 was also widely circulated. Members of the Baath Party could be driven to fierce resistance to the allies through fear of the reprisals that await them with the downfall of the regime. In this respect, we cannot ignore the impressive organisational and mobilisational structure that allowed the party and the regime to organise this resistance.

In order to have enduring significance, pockets of armed resistance must become linked to a popular base, supplying resources as well as the cover of political legitimacy. There are two major groups in the Iraqi population, the Sunni and the Shia, from which such support could theoretically be drawn. The Shia are the majority of the population -60%- and many of them are members in the lower and middle ranges of the Baath Party. These may have joined the party voluntarily, but more likely it was because of employment and promotion opportunities made available by this membership. We cannot strictly rule out that some Shia could take up armed resistance to the allied invasion, but it is unlikely in terms of the severe discrimination and repression they experienced under Saddam Hussein's regime. The Shia are more likely to adopt a neutral stand throughout the conflict, not having much faith in the US due to their experience during the 1991 uprising. On the other hand, the Sunnis, -20% of the population- have also suffered from repression, and would not be averse to seeing the end of Saddam Hussein. If the US can provide them with sufficient guarantees that there will be no widespread reprisals against them, Sunnis will have no reason to defend the regime.

Conclusion:

It can be argued, based on the previous analysis, that there is little chance of military resistance to the allied invasion spreading to wide sections of the Iraqi population. This will especially be the case if elements of this armed resistance become cut off from their leadership and isolated by the growing allied military presence in and around major Iraqi cities. The duration of the war, and the way in which Saddam Hussein is removed from power will have the decisive impact on the future of the resistance. It will automatically disintegrate if there is a palace coup, or the Presidential Guard takes over power in Baghdad. If an agreement is reached with the allies confining post-war prosecutions to top-echelon Baath leaders only, it is likely that other members of the party will become part of the post-war regime either after discarding the party structure, or subjecting it to a massive 'make-over.' If Baghdad falls after a long siege and heavy fighting, a comprehensive purge of the Baathists is likely to take place.

In any event, it is clear that the structure and political and administrative experience of the Baath Party cannot be overlooked in shaping Iraq's future. The party's help may be crucial to the allies in maintaining order and cohesion in Iraq after the fall of the regime. The historical experience of the US in both Japan and Germany following the Second World War suggests the difficulties of conducting wide-range political purges. In view of the absence of a strong middle class and independent institutions, as well as a basic degree of mutual trust between various groups in Iraq after 35 years of oppression, there will be a need to include some Baathists with other political groups in the post-Saddam system.