October, 2003

Iran's Controversial Nuclear Programme

Dr Mohammed Abdel-Salam

When Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi launched an Iranian nuclear programme in 1974, he planned an intensive operation to construct 20 reactors, some of which were to have 1,300 megawatts of power. The project was aborted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on the grounds that it was un-Islamic, and the installations that were left were destroyed by the Iraqi air force in 1981. Later, though, with the Iran-Iraq War raging, the clergy changed its mind.

Reza Amrollah, director of Iran's Nuclear Energy Organisation, stated in 1995 that his country planned to construct 10 nuclear power plants over the next 20 years. Two 1,200-megawatt nuclear reactors were to be established at a cost of around $3bn, with the help of about 150 Russian experts who are currently working onsite in Bushehr.

Iran also signed a contract with China, in 1994, whereby the latter would build two nuclear reactors with total power of 300 megawatts in the south of Iran for the purpose of power generation. China has begun to set plans for this project.

The declared Iranian nuclear programme, supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency -IAEA-, is not, however, the primary source of international concern, even if it transforms Iran into the country with the biggest nuclear industry in the region. The real source of anxiety is the possibility of an accompanying military nuclear programme.

There has been a string of reports from various western sources of a secret Iranian nuclear programme which, via a network of 200 companies, acquires nuclear materials such as plutonium 239 and uranium 235 as well equipment to achieve a higher grade of enriched uranium. Iran has also, according to these sources, succeeded in attracting a number of foreign scientists to assist in this project. This speculation led to claims in the early 1990s that Iran would achieve a qualitative shift in its nuclear capabilities by the end of the decade.

Although the existence of an Iranian military nuclear programme was repeatedly denied by Iranian officials, apprehension and speculation continued. Some believe that Iran acquired nuclear weapons through an undeclared deal with military officials from Kazakhstan at the beginning of the 1990s, during the period of chaos that accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russian sources assert that Iran found similar, less significant bargains through Estonia.

If these deals were indeed made, despite Iranian assurances to the contrary, Iran would in theory now be on the threshold of becoming a military nuclear power.

At the end of 2001, controversy arose as a result of nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which the US considered might be a cover for Iran's move towards the production of nuclear weapons. The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement for peaceful industrial purposes in 1992. A $200m contract was signed two years later to build the first reactor in Bushehr and the two countries talked about Russia's establishment of a second nuclear reactor at the same site. This was to be part of an ambitious Iranian plan to build 10 nuclear power plants over 20 years.

Financial problems deferred the establishment of the second reactor with participating Iranian companies unable to implement their commitments within the allocated time frame. The US, meanwhile, was applying increasing pressure on Russia to amend or even cancel its agreements with Iran. In 1998, Tehran and Moscow reached a new agreement, according to which Russia would finish work on the first reactor in May 2003 while the second would be deferred to 2007.

By 2001, Iranian officials were criticising Russia for its seeming reluctance to complete construction of the first reactor. President Mohammad Khatami paid the first Iranian presidential visit to Russia in March 2001, and it was clear that the nuclear issue was on the top of his agenda. Khatami also expressed willingness to conclude the contract on the second Bushehr reactor, which motivated Moscow to accelerate the pace of work on the first reactor. The main parts for the structure and base of the reactor were transferred to Iran amid expectations that the reactor would be operational in December 2003.

Since this time, the two countries have signed a number of agreements to expand the scope of their cooperation in the areas of long-range missiles, satellite technology and nuclear energy.

The US became increasingly angry at these developments, leading Moscow and Tehran, with the aim of appeasing Washington, to sign a protocol in December 2002 according to which Iran would return its nuclear waste to Russia. In the same vein, Tehran denied that it sought to own nuclear weapons and agreed to allow the US to enter as a third party in the reactor deal. Iran also showed no objection to opening its nuclear establishments to the IAEA and said it would consider joining an additional protocol regulating IAEA inspection that allows for immediate inspections at any time and in any place.

Developments in the second half of 2003 have served only to increase international concern over Iran's nuclear objectives. Six main problems have arisen as a result of various discoveries and accusations:

1- Iran imported around 1.5 tons of natural uranium in the early 1990s without informing the IAEA

2- Iran has launched a programme to develop heavy water manufacturing technology, and already has a facility doing so in Arak

3- Iran is mining natural uranium found near the city of Yazd as a domestic source of nuclear material

4- According to the IAEA and French sources, Iran attempted in 2000 to acquire equipment useful for the re-treatment of nuclear fuel

5- According to Russian sources, Iran is employing foreign experts and scientists from Pakistan, North Korea and some western countries to implement its nuclear programmes

6- Samples of two levels of enriched uranium were found in a nuclear fuel treatment plant in Natanz.

On the basis of this information, the US, still sceptical about Iranian intentions, has declared that Iran is implementing a military nuclear programme and that Russia's completion of the Bushehr plant will provide cover for activities that include plans to manufacture a bomb. Iranian officials, for their part, have stated that there are acceptable technical explanations for all the issues of concern, and further expressed their hope that hasty conclusions be avoided and that the issue not be politicised.

IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei, while not accusing Iran of lying, has said that Tehran has not presented a complete picture of its nuclear programme, thus implying a lack of transparency in its communication with the IAEA. However, when asked whether or not Iran had a clandestine programme to produce nuclear weapons, ElBaradei did not give a clear answer.

Tehran is now working to allay Washington's fears, asserting that its nuclear intentions are peaceful and that from its point of view the possession of nuclear weapons is contrary to the teachings of Islam. While this can be seen as a submission on the part of Tehran to overwhelming US power, it perhaps also reflects a realisation that should the world not be convinced that its intentions are peaceful, it will be denied its nuclear needs - and unable to see the Bushehr reactor come into operation, which will not now be possible before mid-2004.

Despite Iran's readiness to cooperate with the IAEA and the US, and its keenness to explain the claims made against it, the future of the country's nuclear programme - peaceful or not - is no longer a domestic matter. Iran must now wait for the assessment of the IAEA, which will follow an indefinite period of research and inspection in the country. It must also count on the ability, or rather desire, of Russia to handle US pressure. Then, of course, there is the question of whether Washington can be convinced that Iran's ownership of a 1,000-megawatt reactor would not threaten its interests.