October, 2003

Adaptation of Technology and the October War: The Cultural Dimension

Malek Awny

The ability of nations to compete within the context of an international system, where knowledge is translated into applications with an unprecedented impact on daily life, is closely linked to their ability to master and adapt these technological advances to their own needs. The battles of October 1973 revealed the ability of the Egyptian army to devise strategies to successfully confront the better equipped and more technologically advanced Israeli military. These strategies relied on adapting the technology and resources available to produce maximum effect. As such, the October War was a creative response on the part of the Egyptians to the challenges created by the devastating 1967 defeat.

The events of this war put an effective end to the allegations that the poor performance of the Egyptian military in 1967 was a function of cultural and civilisational factors. Our premise is that cultural characteristics are not absolutes, but are a function of social conditioning through education and training, as well as economic and political factors.

Thus the poor performance of the Egyptian military in 1967 was the result of the regime's mismanagement of its human and material resources, and its failure to properly prepare the individuals using the technology available. The imbalance between the level of technology made available by the international community to the Arabs versus Israel also played an important role in this respect, but this issue falls outside the framework of this study.

The performance of the Egyptian military in 1973 was a reflection of the higher level of organisation, training and preparation of the army. The Egyptian army lost approximately 80% of its equipment in 1967, and, with strong Soviet support, the process of re-arming began almost from zero. A new generation assumed positions of leadership within the army and higher levels of education, confidence and practical experience produced a more efficient and professional army.

This study will focus on the tactics employed to achieve the best results with the available technology. It is our argument that these tactics were characterised by creativity and innovation, and illustrate a high ability on the part of Egyptians to deal with and adapt technology.

One of the most complicated problems faced by the engineering corps was finding a means to open pathways through the huge dirt fortification erected on the east bank of the Suez Canal. This was imperative in order for the army to erect bridges for men and equipment to cross into Sinai during operations. This fortification, known as the Bar Lev line, was constructed over a number of years, at a cost of millions of dollars. It included minefields, barbed wire and various other advanced military capabilities. Israeli troops were stationed at various points, ready to launch counter-attacks using tanks with air and artillery support. Together with the water of the Suez Canal, this was considered an insurmountable obstacle.

The Egyptian army experimented for over five years on branches of the River Nile especially prepared to replicate the fortifications on the Suez Canal, using explosives, strikes from the air and artillery and missile fire, but none achieved the necessary results. The solution was provided by an Egyptian officer, Badei Zaki Youssef, adapting a technique used in the construction of the High Dam in Aswan, where he had worked until June 1967. The idea was to pump water from the Suez Canal and direct it with great force against the dirt barrier to open pathways. The water would then pour back into the canal, carrying the dirt with it. It took several years of experimentation to find appropriate pumps and adequate power supplies to operate them. The entire process was approved in its final form in January 1972. This technique showed a high ability of adapting available technology to operational and environmental demands. It also proved the most effective means, creating pathways in only three hours, while all other methods required a minimum of 12-15 hours. This enhanced the advantage of surprise, allowing the main body of troops to cross into Sinai at a speed which was entirely unanticipated by the enemy, totally upsetting Israeli defence plans.

The second major problem the Egyptian military needed to address was the advantage Israel had in terms of the size and quality of its air force and its armoured vehicles and tanks. Both in 1956 and in 1967, Israel was able to control the airspace and to overwhelm the Egyptian army with its tanks. Despite the modernisation of the Egyptian army, it was unable to obtain the size or quality of armaments to significantly decrease this gap. To respond to Israeli superiority in the air, Egypt created a strong network of SAM-2, SAM-3 and later SAM-6 missiles on the west bank of the Suez Canal. This network included over 800 launching pads and a large number of anti-aircraft batteries, and was considered the most dense anti-aircraft defence system in existence at that time.

This defence system was complemented by a force of MiG-21 fighters that extended Egyptian air cover over both sides of the Suez Canal. This defensive system relied on intensive coordination and cooperation between different branches of the armed forces and proved immensely effective in neutralising the Israeli air force.

The Egyptian army also relied on the use of portable anti-tank missiles by the Egyptian infantry with an intensity and scope never before used in any war. The skill and high morale of the soldiers using these missiles allowed them to inflict heavy losses on the Israeli side and to halt all counter-attacks on the ground. The battles engaging tanks were recorded as the largest and fiercest on record till that time. The Egyptian army was able with relatively simple technology, used within the framework of innovative and creative strategies, to foil the overwhelming Israeli power. This situation was only changed through the massive and unprecedented support airlifted from the US to Israel. Despite this, the ability of the Egyptian soldier to use, adapt and achieve higher levels of performance from the technology made available to him, has been irrevocably established.