October, 2003

The October War: A Study in Successful Decision-making

Dr Bahgat Qorani

Thirty years after, the October War of 1973 continues to be regarded as a major turning point, not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but for the Arab region as a whole. The October War not only put an end to the overwhelming sense of devastation and humiliation that the defeat of 1967 left in its wake, it also gave birth to a new reality, in which the Egyptian and Syrian armies for the first time took control of events, were able to mount a successful surprise attack and gave effective expression to the notion of Arab unity. The ability to coordinate a joint military attack, as well as Arab political and economic cooperation in the imposition of the oil embargo involved an intricate process of decision-making. It is extremely pertinent to examine this process today in order to understand the characteristics that made this venture a success.

A careful reading of the documents related to the October War reveals a number of significant points:

1- There was overwhelming popular pressure within Egypt and the Arab world to end the situation of no-peace, no-war that prevailed after 1967. The political leadership was unable to deflect this pressure and was left with no alternative but to wage some form of attack.

2- Despite prevailing theories that decision-making in the Third World is at the mercy of the whims and desires of the ruler, the decision to wage the October War was made on the basis of accurate and complete information. The famous 'notebook' of Brigadier Mohammed Al-Gamasi, chief of operations at the time, including information regarding the best time to attack, along with extended discussions, precise planning and multilateral coordination, resulted in the successful choice of the time and manner of attack.

3- This decision-making process was preceded by extensive preparations, which began immediately following the defeat of 1967. The rebuilding of the Egyptian army proceeded along professional lines, with intensive training. A far larger segment of conscripted soldiers were university graduates, counting for 110,000 out of the 800,000 under arms in 1973.

Another important aspect of precise planning is to adjust the objectives to the resources available. Several alternative military plans were developed in order to suit whatever level of preparations the army had reached at the moment the decision was taken to mount the attack. In the end, two major alternative plans were in place. The first, a limited plan to seize the Bar Lev line and progress 6-8 miles within Sinai, staying within the protective range of the SAM missiles, and a second, more comprehensive plan of attack that allowed for progressing 30-40 miles within Sinai to the area of the strategic straits.

Although the second plan required greater military capabilities, which were unlikely to be attained in a short enough time, it was retained as an alternative for two reasons: to convince the Soviets to send as much advanced weaponry as possible; and to convince Syria that there would be sufficient activity on the Egyptian front to prevent Israel from focusing most of its fire power on the Syrian front.

By 1972, it had become clear to the military that the more ambitious plan would be too risky, and although President Anwar Al-Sadat personally favoured it, he adhered to their advice and adopted the more limited plan that was consistent with the available resources.

4- There was a great level of coordination on both military and economic-political spheres. There was frequent communication between the Syrian and Egyptian military in order to coordinate a simultaneous and surprise attack. Compromises were reached between the two sides based solely on what would be the most suitable objective conditions for attack, ie moonlight, weather conditions, etc.

The process involved in the enforcement of an oil embargo on western states that support Israel epitomises the role of planning, and coordination, in successful decision-making. Preparation on this level was also begun well in advance of the war, by establishing close ties between Egyptian and Saudi leaders. While most of the Saudi elite were initially against using oil as part of the Arab offensive in 1973, they were eventually persuaded to consider this option. This persuasion was in part an outcome of strong Egyptian-Saudi relations, and in part a response to mounting pressure from Arab public opinion. What clinched the deal, however, was the well-documented and objective study prepared by Dr Mostafa Khalil, former Egyptian prime minister, in the spring of 1973. This study was undertaken at the request of the Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies on the suggestion of Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram. The study focused on the energy crisis in the US and its implications, especially for the Arabs. The study, concluded the week before the October War, and presented to Sadat, became the focal point of the Egyptian argument to persuade the oil-producing Arab states to cooperate in this embargo.

A group of prominent Egyptian political advisers reviewed the study and arrived at a strategy that would put pressure on western states that blindly supported Israeli occupation of Arab land, without causing irreparable damage to their economies. While the Egyptian side presented the major outlines of this plan, it was left to the oil-producing Arab states to decide on the details of its implementation according to their own political and economic considerations. Decision-making on the part of these Arab countries also involved extensive consultations, which culminated in a unified stand expressed in a meeting of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries -OAPEC-.

In conclusion, the emphasis placed on the importance of objective factors in this discussion does not imply the unimportance of the decisionmaker. In third world countries, the weakness of institutions and the personalisation of power leave the principal decisionmaker with wide discretionary powers. Decision-making, however, is a compound process in which various variables interact. Successful decision-making involves a balance between the various elements of obtaining accurate information, planning and coordination in order to spare our societies the devastation that results from the absence of these necessary components.