January, 2003

Elections in Israel: Settlement and the Limits of Coercion

Dr. Abdel-Alim Mohammed

The coalition national government established in Israel by the Likud and Labour parties has been the most appropriate formula for the justification of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policy and programme against the Palestinian intifada that erupted on 28 September 2000. Sharon, by means of this government, won Labour support for his policy against the intifada and was able to promote this policy as that of Israel as a whole rather than a single party. Sharon has in fact benefited from the popularity of the Labour Party on the international level to portray himself as a statesman and not a war criminal.

The section of the Labour Party supporting the national government trusted Sharon's ability to put a quick end to the intifada, yet Sharon's promises soon evaporated in the face of the persistence of the intifada.

The earlier belief that Labour participation in the national government would serve to limit Sharon's authority has proved false, with Israeli public opinion tending towards the right and showing sympathy for the extremist beliefs of the Likud. Hence a split between Likud and Labour was not unexpected. This took place when defence minister and Labour Party leader Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, along with ministers from his party, voted against a new Israeli budget, demanding that money earmarked for settlements be used for social programmes. When talks collapsed, Ben-Eliezer and the remainder of Labour's ministers handed in their resignations, effectively ending the coalition.

As a result, Sharon's government lost the majority needed to continue in power and had two alternatives - either to form a new narrow right-wing coalition or to hold early elections. Sharon chose the second option, and elections were scheduled for 28 January 2003.

The preliminary leadership elections within the Likud Party ended with Sharon beating Netanyahu by an overwhelming majority, while Amram Mitzna was chosen for the Labour Party.

According to Israeli public opinion polls, several factors indicate that Sharon has a good chance of winning in the national elections. Sharon has succeeded in consolidating relations between Israel and the United States, which renders him a man of peace. Moreover, Washington understands his motives and his need to defend himself. He has also managed to include the legitimate Palestinian struggle against occupation in the Bush administration's international campaign against terrorism. The old picture of Sharon has started to fade since the events of 11 September 2001, and he has become a champion, defending Israelis against Palestinian terrorism.

However, Sharon's victory is not a foregone conclusion. He has many failures on the security level and has been unable to put an end to the intifada. Sharon's methods for resisting the intifada have had high human costs, have placed a huge burden on the national economy and have been the focus of international criticism.

It seems then that the future of the peace process depends on the Road Map plan submitted by the United States, assuming that its war against Iraq does not take place.

If it does, Israel would definitely be in a position to compel the Palestinians to comply with its desires or to establish a security barrier between itself and the Palestinians.

Consequently, the future of negotiations and settlement between Israel and the Palestinians depends not only on the outcome of the conflict between the political powers in Israel, but also on the Palestinians' ability to resist, rectify their course of struggle and secure Arab support. The settlement process also relies partly on the internal Israeli environment and its readiness to accept negotiation and to recognise the right of the Palestinians to a state and independence.