October, 2002

The Possibilities of New International Intervention in Somalia

Badr Hassan Shafei

The Somali parliament’s approval of the transitional government’s resolution to request the United Nations to send an international peacekeeping force to the country has led to much outside speculation as to the reasons behind it, particularly in light of Somalia’s previous bitter experience of international intervention in 1992. And there is also the extent of acceptance of the various Somali factions, as well as the international community, to consider.

In fact, there are several reasons behind the Somali government’s decision, not least of which are its failure to consolidate its sovereignty and provide security for its citizens, and the increasing authority of armed militias that refuse to recognise its legitimacy. There is also a clear regional prejudice against the new government, especially from Kenya and Ethiopia, both of which occupy part of Somali territory and therefore consider it in their interests to keep Somalia as weak as possible.

The Somali opposition sects have vehemently objected the idea of a return of international forces to Somalia and believe that a government that does not represent them has no right to take such a decision. Yet while the opposition perceives UN intervention as a means of consolidating the position of the transitional government, it would nevertheless support US intervention if it were to guarantee their taking power, as was the case with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

On the international level, attention to the situation in Somalia decreased after 11 September 2001, and the United States is now preoccupied with launching an attack against Iraq. The agreement of the Somali government to Washington’s demands and its cooperation in the pursuit of terrorists also lessened international attention towards the country. The UN, moreover, has not responded warmly to Somalia’s request for peacekeeping forces as a result of both the organisation’s lack of funds for its current operations and the risks involved for international forces in such an operation.

For now, the betting of the Somali government on the UN is a highly risky step, particularly in light of the possible agenda of the peacekeeping forces; previous examples of the presence of other agendas include the international operations in Bosnia and Sierra Leone. In this regard, international intervention could be as dangerous for Somalia as it was in 1992.