October, 2002

Southern Sudan and the Right of Self-Determination

Hani Raslan

The most significant aspect of the Machakos Agreement, signed on 21 July 2002 by the Sudanese government and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army -SPLA-, is that it gives the south the right of self-rule after a six-year transition period, at which point the citizens of the south will vote on whether to maintain unity with the north or announce a separate state.

This development sent shock waves throughout the region, especially in Egypt, where the matter was treated as a big surprise. There is in fact no basis for this attitude. The concept of self-determination for the south as a solution to the Sudanese civil war has been put forth in political circles in that country since the early 1990s, and there are several documented examples of this.

In 1992, the regime in Khartoum signed an agreement with a splitting faction of the SPLA, later to be known as the Frankfurt Document. In this agreement, the regime accepted for the first time, the principle of self-determination for the south.
In 1995, all political opposition forces in Sudan, including the SPLA, came together and issued the ‘Asmara Decrees,’ which included the acceptance of all signing parties to granting the south the right of self-determination.

In 1997, the Sudanese government signed the Khartoum Peace Accord with a number of factions splintering off from SPLA leader John Garang, in which it gave the south the right of self-determination following a referendum to be held after a four-year transitional period.

In 1998, the Sudanese parliament issued a new constitution, stipulating the right of self-determination for the south, thus making this concept a basic component of the constitutional and political structure in Sudan.

It is clear from a close examination of Sudanese politics that each faction hoped to use the card of self-determination for the south to further its own narrow interests. The government used it to try to undermine the forces in the south by dividing and weakening them, thus forcing them to accept its dictates. The opposition political forces in the north, on the other hand, were forced to accept this concept to maintain their alliance with the SPLA, since without the latter, they would have no effective military clout to use against the regime. Finally, Garang maintained a non-separatist stance for propaganda reasons, and argued that the unity of Sudan could be maintained with the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as ending the Arab Muslim elite’s monopoly on power. This position, however, is related to the ability of his movement to effect a significant reshaping of the political configuration in Sudan, allowing him to play a prominent and powerful role. Failing this, the movement would seek to establish a separate and independent state in the south.