July, 2001

New Legal Ground for the Arab-Israeli Boycott

Dr. Abdullah Al-Asha'al

The Cairo Arab Summit of October 2000 and the Amman Arab Summit of March 2001 attempted to respond to Israeli intransigence by taking a number of procedures that might push Israel to return back to the peace track abandoned by former prime ministers Ehud Barak and Binyamin Netanyahu and current prime minister Ariel Sharon. The Arab summit witnessed support for the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the comprehensive Arab boycott of Israel.

However, neither the summit nor the follow-up committee could identify the exact definition, the range or the legal ground of the boycott although such action has always constituted an important element in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As the imposition of the boycott necessitates that the legal basis for the Arab-Israeli relationship be defined, the general assembly of the Arab League -AL- called upon the boycott committee to meet in Damascus.
However, the weak response of the Arab countries to the meetings of the committee in Cairo showed that the resolution needed comprehensive study prior to its issuance.

Nevertheless, the Arab decision to boycott Israel was met with angry Israeli and US reactions on the political and legal levels. On the political level, Washington perceived it as a setback for the peace process, which had been close to achieving Arab acceptance of Israel. The boycott would also lead to a conflict of interests for the United States and large US companies in Israel and the Arab world. This, in turn, would turn around recent Israeli economic and trade progress in some markets of the region. Lately, there has been talk not only of coexistence between Israel and the Arabs, but also to see Israeli products in Arab markets, a matter that prompted Washington and Israel to speak about a new Middle East.

With this setback, the Zionist media began to accuse the Arabs of rejecting peace, claimed to be long advocated by Israel. Israeli media also alleged that the Arabs, having failed to conquer Israel in conflict, had reluctantly accepted peace. On the legal level, Zionist jurists contested the legal ground of the boycott and considered it a hostile action running counter to the their intention of continuing with the peace process. The boycott, for the Israelis, reveals the Arabs' hidden intentions of war and brings back to the fore the general atmosphere of war that was prevalent before the 1991 Madrid conference. They considered it a violation by the Arabs of the legal commitments agreed upon between the two parties in the Madrid conference to work incessantly for peace.
The Zionist jurists also reiterated what the Arabs had concluded since the establishment of the state of Israel. They stated that the Arab-Israeli war and the establishment of Israel based upon the principle of division of land, rejected by the Arabs, and its expansion by power, had created a state of war between Israel and the Arabs. This applies to the Arab countries that participated in the 1948 war and signed the 1949 Rhodes truce with Israel, to those that did not participate directly or were not independent states at the time, as they adhered later to the AL charter. Israel's attitude regarding the agreements of the truce showed that they did not take it seriously and that the war would go on. This was proved by Israel's bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, claiming that Iraq had participated in the 1948 war and had not signed the truce. Yet this was not the case with Lebanon, which although had not participated in the 1948 war still signed the truce. Israel reiterated that its aircraft's violation of Saudi airspace to reach Iraq was justified by the fact that Israel and Saudi Arabia were engaged in a state of war. Israel attributed this to the participation of the Saudi troops in the 1948 war among the Egyptian forces, to Saudi Arabia's support of the antagonist Arab stance against Israel and to its rejection of the establishment of peace with Israel because of the Israeli position on Jerusalem.

Such intertwining conditions have made relations between Israel and the Arab world extremely complex. Some countries accepted Security Council Resolution 242 however, this resolution does not actually terminate the state of war even if its application might lead the parties to sign a peace agreement.

The Zionist jurisdiction intensified its attack on Egypt and Jordan, which had signed peace agreements with Israel in 1979 and 1984 stating the termination of the state of war between both sides. Zionist jurists stressed that Egypt, before signing the agreement, had banned Israel from using the Suez Canal because of the state of war. The same jurisdiction did not mention that Israel had always denied this state of war and spared no effort to push the Arab countries to acknowledge the state of Israel using a number of legal ruses that were soon criticised internationally. Among these ruses were the allegation that the membership of both Israel and the Arab countries in the UN urged them all to fulfil the objectives of the international organisation according to its principles and charter.

A prior study of three main points was essential before the Arab boycott decision was approved by the Arab summits and the consequent confirmation by the Doha Islamic summit and finally by the emergency May 2001 ministerial summit of the Islamic countries. This applies if the resolution was actually meant to express pressure against Israel and not only to contain the rage of the Arab public at their governments' failure to confront the Israeli escalation of violence against the Palestinians.

The first point is the legal fabric of the Arab-Israeli relationship. Egypt and Jordan are bound with Israel by peace treaties regardless of the extent of the normalisation these treaties fulfil. Mauritania and Israel exchange normal diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors. This applies as well to Tunisia and Morocco, which exchange diplomatic representation with Israel at the level of chargés d'affaires. Israel also keeps a trade representation office in Qatar. Although Tunisia and Morocco cut their diplomatic relations with Israel since the Cairo October 2000 summit to articulate their support of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, it remains a fact that Israel is no longer engaged in a state of war with these six Arab countries.

As for Israeli-Palestinian relations, these are ruled by the fourth Geneva agreement on the grounds that Israel is an occupying authority and that its existence is the result of an occupation by use of power. According to the charter of the UN, power and occupation do not enjoy any sort of legitimacy.
Hence, Oslo and the consequent executive agreements are not considered as peace agreements but rather as tools to evacuate Israeli forces from the Palestinian territories.

In spite of the hope that had overwhelmed the Arab world that the bilateral and multilateral talks were preliminaries to peace, the Arab states, except for the seven countries mentioned above, are technically considered to be in a state of war with Israel. This applies especially to Syria, which was engaged in wars with Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Termination of war with countries engaged in war with Israel is different to termination of war with countries not still engaged in war. Countries engaged in war with Israel should terminate the state of war by means of a peace agreement. But when it comes to countries not engaged in war with Israel, the state of war and hostility is terminated by means of an Arab summit resolution that approves general reconciliation and terminates legal rivalry with Arab countries that accept to do so.

The second point is the range of the boycott needed to be imposed against Israel. The resolutions of the Arab summit seem to aim at reviving the old Arab boycott of Israel. The boycott comprises all aspects of political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and sporting activities. While Israel is the main object of the boycott, it will also extend to parties that deal with Israeli companies, interests or services, including any sort of investment or other elements that might bolster Israel's power and ability to go on with its suppressive policy against the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the nature of modern economic relations and the impact of economic globalisation necessitate more study and consideration when applying the second-degree boycott. Matters are getting more complicated as a result of the expanding network of diplomatic relations that Israel achieved during the warm atmosphere accompanying the Palestinian-Israeli talks. Making use of this atmosphere, Israel removed all the shackles that the Arab world had imposed against it in important areas of international work.

The third point is the need to search for new legal grounds for the Arab boycott of Israel. Arab jurisdiction grounded the boycott upon the emergence of a state of war. Israel, however, rejects this on the basis that they are not in a state of war under contemporary international law, especially since the UN charter substituted the term 'war' by 'power or threat to use power.'
However, whenever Israel found itself in need to justify its violations and aggression against the Arab countries, it resorted to the state of war existent between the two parties and did not favour any truce with the Arab world. This was the case when it bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq and when it violated Saudi airspace, although it could not find any justification for its aggression in Lebanon.International relations since the second world war differentiate between the legal state of war and the actual state of war, Such cases differ from the hostile or antagonist actions of non-biased countries or those who adhere to the commitments of non-alignment. This explains why declarations of war are becoming all the more rare. Iraq and Iran, for example, were engaged in an eight-year war during which they never cut diplomatic
relations, although this is usually the case prior to conflict. This indicates how the practical tendency is growing in contemporary international relations.
On the other hand, international relations are witnessing what are known as reprisals among other means of countermeasures, which means pressures and procedures used to fulfil national political targets. The United States is a prime example, extending its use of countermeasures, including placing economic and commercial boycotts against enemies or allies without necessarily being engaged in a state of war with them. Among these procedures were the measures taken by the EU against Austria to express objection to the election of an extremist right-wing prime minister.

This brings us to the conclusion that if boycotts were previously a consequence of war, they are currently used as a legitimate countermeasure during peace.
The new Arab boycott is thus legally based on the justification of this procedure in international jurisdiction, regardless of the recognition of Israel by some Arab countries. This does not forbid the Arab countries that have peace treaties with Israel from participating in the boycott without considering this a violation of their commitments in the peace treaties. The content of the peace treaties emphasises the commitments implied in the UN charter, especially with regard to the banning of the use of power, the threat to use power and the commitment to settle disputes peacefully .It is worth mentioning in this regard that the boycott resolution against Israel, believed by the whole world to have violated peace and thus jeopardised the whole region, is not considered as a means of suppression against Israel, which would need the prior consent of the Security Council.

It is rather a procedure of collective pressure that is even less acute than the EU procedures taken against Austria, taking into consideration that Austria is an EU member. The Arab boycott of Israel can be based upon principles of respect for the commitments and policies of the international community vision of the peace process and the Arabs' right to defend themselves against threats of war and destruction.
This legal ground allows Egypt to justify its attempt to adjust its commitments to the peace treaty, which do not include any ban of the use of countermeasures relating to its commitments to collective Arab security. This goes back to the fact that the collective Arab boycott is not one of the measures of Arab security mentioned in the 1950 treaty.



The Cairo Arab Summit of October 2000 and the Amman Arab Summit of March 2001 attempted to respond to Israeli intransigence by taking a number of procedures that might push Israel to return back to the peace track abandoned by former prime ministers Ehud Barak and Binyamin Netanyahu and current prime minister Ariel Sharon. The Arab summit witnessed support for the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the comprehensive Arab boycott of Israel.

However, neither the summit nor the follow-up committee could identify the exact definition, the range or the legal ground of the boycott although such action has always constituted an important element in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As the imposition of the boycott necessitates that the legal basis for the Arab-Israeli relationship be defined, the general assembly of the Arab League -AL- called upon the boycott committee to meet in Damascus.
However, the weak response of the Arab countries to the meetings of the committee in Cairo showed that the resolution needed comprehensive study prior to its issuance.

Nevertheless, the Arab decision to boycott Israel was met with angry Israeli and US reactions on the political and legal levels. On the political level, Washington perceived it as a setback for the peace process, which had been close to achieving Arab acceptance of Israel. The boycott would also lead to a conflict of interests for the United States and large US companies in Israel and the Arab world. This, in turn, would turn around recent Israeli economic and trade progress in some markets of the region. Lately, there has been talk not only of coexistence between Israel and the Arabs, but also to see Israeli products in Arab markets, a matter that prompted Washington and Israel to speak about a new Middle East.

With this setback, the Zionist media began to accuse the Arabs of rejecting peace, claimed to be long advocated by Israel. Israeli media also alleged that the Arabs, having failed to conquer Israel in conflict, had reluctantly accepted peace. On the legal level, Zionist jurists contested the legal ground of the boycott and considered it a hostile action running counter to the their intention of continuing with the peace process. The boycott, for the Israelis, reveals the Arabs' hidden intentions of war and brings back to the fore the general atmosphere of war that was prevalent before the 1991 Madrid conference. They considered it a violation by the Arabs of the legal commitments agreed upon between the two parties in the Madrid conference to work incessantly for peace.
The Zionist jurists also reiterated what the Arabs had concluded since the establishment of the state of Israel. They stated that the Arab-Israeli war and the establishment of Israel based upon the principle of division of land, rejected by the Arabs, and its expansion by power, had created a state of war between Israel and the Arabs. This applies to the Arab countries that participated in the 1948 war and signed the 1949 Rhodes truce with Israel, to those that did not participate directly or were not independent states at the time, as they adhered later to the AL charter. Israel's attitude regarding the agreements of the truce showed that they did not take it seriously and that the war would go on. This was proved by Israel's bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, claiming that Iraq had participated in the 1948 war and had not signed the truce. Yet this was not the case with Lebanon, which although had not participated in the 1948 war still signed the truce. Israel reiterated that its aircraft's violation of Saudi airspace to reach Iraq was justified by the fact that Israel and Saudi Arabia were engaged in a state of war. Israel attributed this to the participation of the Saudi troops in the 1948 war among the Egyptian forces, to Saudi Arabia's support of the antagonist Arab stance against Israel and to its rejection of the establishment of peace with Israel because of the Israeli position on Jerusalem.

Such intertwining conditions have made relations between Israel and the Arab world extremely complex. Some countries accepted Security Council Resolution 242 however, this resolution does not actually terminate the state of war even if its application might lead the parties to sign a peace agreement.
The Zionist jurisdiction intensified its attack on Egypt and Jordan, which had signed peace agreements with Israel in 1979 and 1984 stating the termination of the state of war between both sides. Zionist jurists stressed that Egypt, before signing the agreement, had banned Israel from using the Suez Canal because of the state of war. The same jurisdiction did not mention that Israel had always denied this state of war and spared no effort to push the Arab countries to acknowledge the state of Israel using a number of legal ruses that were soon criticised internationally. Among these ruses were the allegation that the membership of both Israel and the Arab countries in the UN urged them all to fulfil the objectives of the international organisation according to its principles and charter.

A prior study of three main points was essential before the Arab boycott decision was approved by the Arab summits and the consequent confirmation by the Doha Islamic summit and finally by the emergency May 2001 ministerial summit of the Islamic countries. This applies if the resolution was actually meant to express pressure against Israel and not only to contain the rage of the Arab public at their governments' failure to confront the Israeli escalation of violence against the Palestinians.

The first point is the legal fabric of the Arab-Israeli relationship. Egypt and Jordan are bound with Israel by peace treaties regardless of the extent of the normalisation these treaties fulfil. Mauritania and Israel exchange normal diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors. This applies as well to Tunisia and Morocco, which exchange diplomatic representation with Israel at the level of chargés d'affaires. Israel also keeps a trade representation office in Qatar. Although Tunisia and Morocco cut their diplomatic relations with Israel since the Cairo October 2000 summit to articulate their support of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, it remains a fact that Israel is no longer engaged in a state of war with these six Arab countries.

As for Israeli-Palestinian relations, these are ruled by the fourth Geneva agreement on the grounds that Israel is an occupying authority and that its existence is the result of an occupation by use of power. According to the charter of the UN, power and occupation do not enjoy any sort of legitimacy.
Hence, Oslo and the consequent executive agreements are not considered as peace agreements but rather as tools to evacuate Israeli forces from the Palestinian territories.

In spite of the hope that had overwhelmed the Arab world that the bilateral and multilateral talks were preliminaries to peace, the Arab states, except for the seven countries mentioned above, are technically considered to be in a state of war with Israel. This applies especially to Syria, which was engaged in wars with Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Termination of war with countries engaged in war with Israel is different to termination of war with countries not still engaged in war. Countries engaged in war with Israel should terminate the state of war by means of a peace agreement. But when it comes to countries not engaged in war with Israel, the state of war and hostility is terminated by means of an Arab summit resolution that approves general reconciliation and terminates legal rivalry with Arab countries that accept to do so.

The second point is the range of the boycott needed to be imposed against Israel. The resolutions of the Arab summit seem to aim at reviving the old Arab boycott of Israel. The boycott comprises all aspects of political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and sporting activities. While Israel is the main object of the boycott, it will also extend to parties that deal with Israeli companies, interests or services, including any sort of investment or other elements that might bolster Israel's power and ability to go on with its suppressive policy against the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the nature of modern economic relations and the impact of economic globalisation necessitate more study and consideration when applying the second-degree boycott. Matters are getting more complicated as a result of the expanding network of diplomatic relations that Israel achieved during the warm atmosphere accompanying the Palestinian-Israeli talks. Making use of this atmosphere, Israel removed all the shackles that the Arab world had imposed against it in important areas of international work.

The third point is the need to search for new legal grounds for the Arab boycott of Israel. Arab jurisdiction grounded the boycott upon the emergence of a state of war. Israel, however, rejects this on the basis that they are not in a state of war under contemporary international law, especially since the UN charter substituted the term 'war' by 'power or threat to use power.'

However, whenever Israel found itself in need to justify its violations and aggression against the Arab countries, it resorted to the state of war existent between the two parties and did not favour any truce with the Arab world. This was the case when it bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq and when it violated Saudi airspace, although it could not find any justification for its aggression in Lebanon.International relations since the second world war differentiate between the legal state of war and the actual state of war, Such cases differ from the hostile or antagonist actions of non-biased countries or those who adhere to the commitments of non-alignment. This explains why declarations of war are becoming all the more rare. Iraq and Iran, for example, were engaged in an eight-year war during which they never cut diplomatic
relations, although this is usually the case prior to conflict. This indicates how the practical tendency is growing in contemporary international relations.
On the other hand, international relations are witnessing what are known as reprisals among other means of countermeasures, which means pressures and procedures used to fulfil national political targets. The United States is a prime example, extending its use of countermeasures, including placing economic and commercial boycotts against enemies or allies without necessarily being engaged in a state of war with them. Among these procedures were the measures taken by the EU against Austria to express objection to the election of an extremist right-wing prime minister.

This brings us to the conclusion that if boycotts were previously a consequence of war, they are currently used as a legitimate countermeasure during peace.
The new Arab boycott is thus legally based on the justification of this procedure in international jurisdiction, regardless of the recognition of Israel by some Arab countries. This does not forbid the Arab countries that have peace treaties with Israel from participating in the boycott without considering this a violation of their commitments in the peace treaties. The content of the peace treaties emphasises the commitments implied in the UN charter, especially with regard to the banning of the use of power, the threat to use power and the commitment to settle disputes peacefully .It is worth mentioning in this regard that the boycott resolution against Israel, believed by the whole world to have violated peace and thus jeopardised the whole region, is not considered as a means of suppression against Israel, which would need the prior consent of the Security Council.

It is rather a procedure of collective pressure that is even less acute than the EU procedures taken against Austria, taking into consideration that Austria is an EU member. The Arab boycott of Israel can be based upon principles of respect for the commitments and policies of the international community vision of the peace process and the Arabs' right to defend themselves against threats of war and destruction.

This legal ground allows Egypt to justify its attempt to adjust its commitments to the peace treaty, which do not include any ban of the use of countermeasures relating to its commitments to collective Arab security. This goes back to the fact that the collective Arab boycott is not one of the measures of Arab security mentioned in the 1950 treaty.