July, 2001

Egyptian Diplomacy and the Challenges of a New World

Dr. Osama Al-Ghazali Harb

Following a long period of anticipation in Egypt and the Arab world, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak issued a decree in mid-May appointing Ahmed Maher as foreign minister following the appointment of Amr Moussa as Arab League secretary-general. This state of anticipation reflects not only the crucial central significance of the post of foreign minister in Egypt, but also the attention of the Arab public to the minister's performance. This should come as no surprise; however, bearing in mind that Egyptian foreign policy has always been one of Egypt's national assets as well as one of the main indicators of its independence. This is directly mirrored in the importance of the executive mechanism of this policy, namely the Egyptian diplomatic body, headed by the foreign minister.

From a historical point of view, and as alluded to by Dr Younan Labib Rizq, the existence of an independent governmental body that handles foreign affairs existed long before there was an Egyptian foreign policy and even before the establishment of a comprehensive Egyptian diplomatic body. The preliminaries of this body started in 1826 in the age of Mohammed Ali, which coincided with the establishment of the modern Egyptian State. It was first named the 'Diwan of Foreign Trade and Affairs', then renamed 'Diwan of Foreign Affairs' and in the age of Khedive Ismail, it was named the 'wizara of Foreign Affairs', founded by the first cabinet in Egypt in 1878.

The mission of this body, from its establishment until Egypt was declared a British protectorate in1914, was confined to dealing with all that was foreign in Egypt, including commercial interests and foreign treaties. The second qualitative step forward was the deficient independence that Egypt got according to the 28 February declaration. Accordingly, the Egyptian foreign ministry not only came back to life, but the government of the king of Egypt got the right to send diplomatic missions to countries with diplomatic representation in Egypt.
The first delegate of Egyptian diplomats was appointed by royal decree in September 1923, stipulating the establishment of the Egyptian Diplomatic Corps. The establishment of the Egyptian Diplomatic Corps in the light of the four reservations of the February declaration hindered the crystallisation of a clear Egyptian foreign policy. In this context, one can say that the third qualitative shift in the development of Egyptian diplomacy came with the signing of the 1936 treaty, according to which the Egyptian Diplomatic Corps worked with a relatively independent foreign policy. However, a considerable part of the policy was devoted to settlement of national problems and the fulfilment of complete independence as well as a number of issues related to international developments. These developments included Egyptian-Italian relations, influenced by Italy's occupation of Libya and Ethiopia, and French-Egyptian relations, acknowledgement of the Soviet Union, and British involvement in the Second World War.

With the eruption of the July Revolution, there emerged a vision for an independent foreign policy according to which Egyptian diplomacy started a new stage. This was formulated according to a new vision for a regional and international role for Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to formulate this role, removing all the shackles that had curbed Egypt's movement before the revolution, heading towards the most well-known three circles of Egyptian movement: Arab, African and Islamic. The endeavour of Egypt under Nasser to accomplish this role was accompanied with changes in the diplomatic corps that were definitely affected by the nature of the system of the July Revolution.
Generally speaking, the Egyptian diplomacy corps was the most stable body in the Egyptian State. The foreign ministry under Nasser knew only the names of Mahmoud Fawzi and Mahmoud Riad. The numerous changes during Anwar Al-Sadat's era go back to the consequences of his visit to Jerusalem and the start of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. The foreign ministry restored its tranquillity and stability under Mubarak's rule, with Esmat Abdel Meguid and Moussa as ministers.
In this context, one can figure out that the fifth stage in the development of the Egyptian diplomatic body came as a response not to internal developments as much as it was a response to overwhelming foreign developments since the outset of the 1990s. Assuming power, Moussa spared no effort to respond to these developments, by means of introducing new organisational additions and changes. He responded as well to the changes taking place in Egypt's role on the regional and international levels. This was mirrored in the new approaches adopted towards issues such as human rights, the environment, interaction between cultures and civilisations, non-governmental organisations, scientific research, technology, different areas of international economic cooperation, foreign areas of regional cooperation -African, Mediterranean and European- and the consolidation of cooperation between governmental bodies and research centres and Egyptian universities.

Maher is expected to move in the same direction, promoting the Egyptian diplomatic body to be more able to handle the challenges of the New World order. In this framework one can recognise three main issues standing in the way of promoting for diplomatic work. The first is the clear definition of the role of Egyptian foreign policy and the exact missions of the diplomatic body in light of the changes in Egyptian Arab, African and Islamic roles. This was manifested during the last two decades in the debate witnessed about the Middle Eastern cooperation seen by some as contrasting to Arab cooperation. Observers perceived Egyptian Mediterranean cooperation as an indication for the increasing attention attributed to the Egyptian-Mediterranean relations, not only as a prelude to cooperation with Europe -North Mediterranean- but also for cooperation with all Mediterranean countries. The same holds good to the expansion of the Egyptian Asian relation on the economic and political levels. Furthermore, the Islamic area of Egyptian movement should be complemented and enhanced by a pioneering Egyptian role in the framework of the dialogue of cultures and civilisations. The post-peace challenges, whatever the obstacles hindering the current peace process are, should be the focus of serious study so as not to run against a new status that we are not prepared to deal with.

Accomplishing these roles is a responsibility shouldered chiefly by Egyptian diplomacy. Although the president is the prime decision-maker, the Egyptian diplomats working in the framework of the foreign ministry should shoulder the responsibility of implementing this policy. They should also take the initiative to move in some areas that do not necessarily occupy major positions in the president's foreign concerns.

The second issue is the non-centrality in the performance of the Egyptian foreign ministry. Observers of Egyptian diplomacy agree that the minister's office plays a distinguished role in the foreign ministry, in comparison to roles of other departments of the ministry. The minister's office gained more impetus in Moussa's era, which led eventually to the marginalisation of the other specialised departments or at least some of them. The organisational revolution that Moussa initiated when he assumed power meant to enhance the roles and efficiency of different specialised departments. However, with practical application, it ended up that mechanisms of work in the ministry, similar to other civil bodies in Egypt, centred around one chief department; this actually took place especially during the last few years. It seems that the new minister realised this problem and articulated his sincere desire that the whole ministry would be his office. Attaining this goal would certainly be a big achievement. The distinguished cadres and energies in the Egyptian diplomatic body, if were seriously organised and made use of, can mark a breakthrough towards accomplishing the new roles of Egyptian foreign policy.

The third issue is the old problem of specialisation of Egyptian diplomats. Observers of Egyptian diplomacy are looking forward to attaining the goal of a specialised diplomat, who enjoys a wide and deep knowledge of a certain country or region in specific or of a specific vital issue. This is not the case now in the Egyptian foreign ministry where the Egyptian diplomat moves from one area or country to the other and moves as well among different political and international areas. This eventually furnishes the diplomat with an opportunity to expand his expertise and train him to cope with the limited resources, and limited diplomatic manpower. Specialisation, however, still has its own advantages that respond to the enormous development of the diplomatic work mechanisms. This is apt as well to diversify the diplomat's areas of interest and enhances competition between specialised diplomats in the developed countries. The foreign ministry owns the capabilities and energies needed to move ahead towards the fulfilment of the specialisation principle along with setting the bases and conditions that fulfil the interests of the Egyptian diplomat and Egyptian diplomacy in general.