January, 2001

Nasser's Management of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Dr. Hassan Nafa'a

Justification and slander are the two main features marking most of the political writings that deal with Egypt's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Nasserite age. Some observers condemn Former president Gamal Abdel-Nasser to be the sole person responsible for Egypt's entry into the Arab-Israeli conflict. They overlook the fact that Egypt was involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict before Nasser, and is still involved on official and non-official levels, 30 years later.


Egypt's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict reflects its pioneering role in the region. The main reasons for this involvement were the protection of its national security and other national, religious and cultural considerations. It was hence not strange that Egypt was a pivotal party in the conflict, before and after the July 1952 Revolution and during and after the Cold War.


Researchers agree that Nasser was not a dogmatic leader who shaped his policies according to ready-made theories. However pragmatic, he enjoyed an obvious ideological intellect that was still influenced by a number of national and communist trends. When Nasser took over, his vision of Israel did not run counter to that of the Egyptian elite. It was deep rooted in the minds of the Egyptian national movement with its different trends that Israel was an expanding state with hostile tendencies and a tool in the hands of colonialist powers willing to impose their control in the region. On the other hand, Israel constituted a barrier that impeded Egypt's expansion and geographic extension in the eastern part of the Arab world. Handling such a threat required a particular strategy, and there is no evidence that Nasser had any specific strategy for approaching this conflict, whether on the political or military levels.


Nasser's objective was to build a modern Egyptian state capable of guiding the Arab world towards freedom and independence, a target that inevitably clashed with the expanding hostile Zionist project. Nasser realized that the Zionist project jeopardized Egypt's vital interests. He had in mind that the success of his project would inevitably imply the containment of the Israeli threat. Nasser realized that Israel would not allow him to establish a contemporary Egyptian state and unite the Arab world. Nasser had then to form a strategy to deal with the Israeli response to his project.


Nasser's management of the Israeli conflict was a defensive response. Nasser did not start to take the initiative except until the 1967 defeat; he was convinced that he would never restore Sinai by peaceful means and that war is an inevitable alternative.
Nasser's strategies towards Israel:


-Strategy of containment: which continued after the July revolution to the 1956 aggression.

-Strategy of reaction and crisis management: which continued from 1956 to 1967.

-Strategy of confrontation: which started after the 1967 defeat and continued until Nasser's departure in 1970.

It is not by any means true that Nasser has magnified the Israeli threat. On the contrary, he at times underestimated it. There was a gap between Nasser's discourse with its implications of full realization of the Israeli danger, and the degree of readiness he did showed to confront danger.


The full realization of the Israeli threat necessitated the adoption of a clear-cut strategy to confront and manage the conflict. Yet Nasser could not establish the required solid coherent internal front to stand up to all alternatives, including armed conflict. He also failed to provide the necessary Arab and international front, especially in the period between 1956 and 1967.


The post 1967 era restored Nasser's capabilities and potential, yet the strategy of that era was to a great extent related to his personal presence. However, no one can deny Nasser's role in achieving the great 1973 victory, and he was not involved with the means of handling the war on the political level following the ceasefire. However, Nasser still shares the responsibility of the war for several reasons, topped by his choice of Anwar Al-Sadat. Nasser had also accepted UN Resolution 242 and then the Rogers initiative. Whilst Resolution 242 changed from a mechanism of terminating the 1967 aggression to a mechanism of final settlement during Al Sadat's era, the Roger's Initiative also changed from being a mere diplomatic maneuver in the light of the bipolar order to a tool in the hands of the United States to impose its hegemony in the region. Although this was by no means Nasser's intention, he definitely paved the way for the consequent developments.