Although Sudan was one of the first Arab and African countries to achieve independence, in early 1956, the period that followed has been characterised by instability and civil war in the south of the country has led to a series of military coups. Since independence, the country has passed through six different eras of rule:

- the first era of autonomy and democracy (1954-58)

- the first era of military rule (1958-64)

- the Second Popular and Democratic October Revolution (1964-69)

- the second military coup d’état and the May era (1969-1985)

- the Third Democratic April/Rajab intifada (1985-89)

- the era of the Salvation Regime, following a coup d’état on 30 June 1989.

Sudan has thus been governed for 38 years by regimes that took control through coups and for 11 years by pluralist, parliamentary democratic systems.

The first democratic era, which started before independence and continued till 1958, was the longest period of democratic rule in Sudan, yet partisan differences brought this era to an end on 17 November 1958 when Al-Sayyed Abdullah Khalil, then prime minister, requested the army to take control, as reported by Lieutenant General Ibrahim Aboud in his testimony after the collapse of the system when the Popular October Revolution of 1964 erupted.⁽¹⁾ During the six years that the Aboud regime held control it achieved a number of economic achievements though it was corrupt and removed citizens’ freedoms. Perhaps its biggest failure though was its inability to solve the problem in the south, which worsened during this period.

This paper aims to provide a review of the most prominent political phenomena and developments in Sudan tackled in Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya over the past 40 years.

The October Revolution and the second democratic era (1965-69)

The second democratic era began with the Popular 21 October Revolution in 1964, which removed the Aboud regime and continued till May 1969. After the October Revolution, a government was formed under the leadership of Serr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa by national consensus. Yet the sectarian parties’ leaders applied pressure on him until he resigned and formed a separate partisan government. After election, the parties returned once more and formed a coalition government comprising the Umma Party and the Sudanese National Union Party.

Two public elections were held during this period, which witnessed four governments representing different coalitions, reflecting the political instability of the era as well as the worsening situation in the south. This was also a time of extensive popular and union activity, with frequent strikes and demonstrations calling for increased salaries. Regional groups and aggregations were also demanding development in non-central regions, such as the Beja Conference in eastern Sudan, the General Union of the Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan and the Darfur Renaissance Front in the west. Conflict between these groups, on one hand, and the two ruling parties, on the other, was intense.

At the same time, secession and partisan competition were increasing. The Umma Party split into two wings: one under the leadership of Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi, calling for reform, openness and renovation, and the other led by Imam Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar. The Sudanese National Union Party shifted its alliance from Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi to Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi. Parties resorted to undemocratic practices as a result of intense competition and political manoeuvring, which brought about the dismissal of the Sudanese Communist Party from the founding association. The political powers refused to abide by the verdict of the judiciary, which called for the return of the dismissed representatives. In order to defeat Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi’s wing, which was supported by the majority of Umma Party members after the split, the competing parties decided to disband parliament, which they achieved when more than one-third of MPs resigned.

Major differences also arose between the southern and northern parties over the extent of autonomy to be awarded the south, while further disagreements surfaced between all parties over primary issues such as the nature of the permanent constitution and whether it should be secular or Islamic, the nature of the ruling system and whether it should take a presidential or parliamentary form, and the structure of the state and whether it should be federal or centralised.

The deterioration of the situation in the south was one of the main reasons for the eruption of the October Revolution, as a result of which Al-Khalifa’s government made contact with various rebel leaders, leading to the holding of a roundtable conference on 6 March 1965. The conference, attended by observers from Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, endorsed a regional ruling system and the formation of a legislative council for each region with a local leader. However, attendees failed to reach a final status agreement on the system of rule as a result of differences over various issues, including geographic division. Southern groups were also concerned over the issues of separation, federation and self-determination, which allowed for increased foreign intervention in their internal affairs. The proposals of all the parties were referred to the Commission of 12, formed in June 1965, made up of six representatives from the northern parties and six from the southern ones. The commission recommended substitution of the central ruling system with a regional one and the establishment of a university in the south, though neither was implemented.

The situation in the south worsened in 1965 following the outbreak of violence in Juba and Wau, while differences increased in the north over the constitution commission, which was boycotted by certain southern parties (Sanu and the Southern Front) as well as the People’s Democratic Party. The southern representatives boycotted the constitution commission in December 1968 as they perceived that the proposed constitution discriminated between citizens on the basis of religion and race, rendering it unacceptable for southerners.”⁽²⁾ This was followed by secession in the Umma Party. All these factors paved the way for the Free Officers’ Organisation to seize power, inspired by the 23 July Revolution in Egypt. The organisation was supported by the Sudanese Communist Party, which took several ministerial positions in the new government alongside members of certain Nasserite parties and supporters of pan-Arabism.

The May government (1969-85)

The Free Officers’ Organisation carried out what is known as the Nimeri Revolution on 25 May 1969. The organisation, which began in secret in 1959, included elements from the Communist Party, the Nasserites and democrats from among the graduates of the Military Academy.

In July 1971, three members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) who had been removed by President Jaafar Nimeri on 16 November 1970 carried out a military coup against the May government, named the “coup of Hashem Al-Atta.” The three officers held control for only three days after which Nimeri restored authority on 22 July 1971 by means of a counter coup. The three men, in addition to some communist leaders, were sentenced to death.⁽³⁾

The May regime took a violent approach towards its opponents, violating human rights, torturing those standing against it and trying them before military courts that sentenced them to death. It also carried out massacres against the Ansar in several regions of Sudan on 27 February 1970. The opposition was thus urged to form armed popular groups, and camps were established in Ethiopia and Libya to train militias formed by the Sudanese National Front – comprising the Umma Party and Unionists led by Hussein Al-Hindi and the Muslim Brothers. Hussein Hassan Othman led a coup in September 1975. In July 1976, the armed forces of the Sudanese National Front, led by Mohammed Nour Saad, formed the July movement, also known as the “mercenary movement.”

With the anger and strength of the opposition growing, the regime entered into dialogue with it in order to achieve national reconciliation. On 18 March 1978, Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi, Ahmed Al-Merghani and Hassan Al-Turabi were appointed in the political bureau of the Socialist Union. Bakri Adil was chosen as leader of Kordofan and Sherif Al-Tuhami as minister for energy.⁽⁴⁾ The Umma Party and some members of the Union Party withdrew from the reconciliation process and stepped back from the May regime. The Muslim Brothers, led by Al-Turabi, agreed to symbolic participation in the regime’s institutions, which provided the movement with an opportunity to increase both its numbers and scope of movement on all levels.

The May regime had to contend with a number of changes in political trends – socialism, pan-Arabism, nationalism, national reconciliation, capitalism and finally Islamism, which brought about the application of Sharia law – and it shifted its allegiance from the Soviet Union to the West. In 1973, the regime approved and ratified the establishment of a one-party presidential system for the republic.

One of the main concerns of the May regime was the situation in the south of the country. In June 1969, after less than one month in power, the military issued what became known as the 9 June declaration, which acknowledged the historic and cultural differences between the north and south. The southerners reasserted their right to develop their culture within a unified Sudan and called for a system of regional government in the southern territories. The declaration was hailed by the Ananya movement, which initiated the contact between the government and rebel movements. The southern parties played a considerable role in bridging the gap between the disputing parties and these efforts were rewarded with success in February 1973 at the Addis Ababa conference. The resulting agreement, signed on 27 February 1973 by the government and the Ananya movement, stipulated the establishment of self-rule in southern Sudan. This was enshrined in an article in the Sudanese constitution in 1973, leading many to consider the agreement as the greatest achievement of the May regime.

The application of the Addis Ababa agreement brought stability to the south and paved the way for the launching of limited development projects. However, the decree dividing the south – supported by some southern politicians – saw differences and mutual distrust between the south and the north re-emerge, and was a pretext for the emergence of a new rebel movement, which was formed prior to the application of Islamic Sharia law in September 1983. The introduction of Sharia law not only worried southerners, but also led powers in both the eastern and western blocs to attempt to form coalitions with the rebel movement in order bring about a reversal of the decision and to weaken the government.

The May regime also focused on economic development and the enhancement of national unity, attempting to end the control of traditional sectarian forces and to form a new ruling system comprising all acting social powers. In the end, however, it was toppled by the intifada, after which the civil war intensified as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), under the leadership of John Garang, took control of 80% of the south. Economic conditions deteriorated leaving the government unable to provide people with their basic needs of wheat, oil and sugar, while international donor agencies stopped dealing with Sudan as it was unable to meet its debt repayment schedule.⁽⁵⁾

The third democratic April/ Rajab intifada (1985-89)

On 6 April 1985, the general command of the armed forces joined with the popular forces following the intifada against the May regime. The general command declared a one-year transitional period at the end of which elections would be held to return authority to the people. The army leadership allowed the establishment of parties and the issuance of newspapers, and pluralism once again became a feature of political life. In an unprecedented step, the general command fulfilled its promises and handed over authority to elected parliamentary representatives.

The ruling system during the third democratic era faced a number of problems, complicated by the role played by the National Congress in uniting parties and syndicates. Perhaps the greatest mistake of the National Congress, however, was its isolationist policy and its tendency towards political discrimination. Nevertheless, the military council, led by Abdel-Rahman Sewar Al-Zahab, was able to curb the extremist wave.⁽⁶⁾

The agreement signed by the National Congress and the rebel movement in March 1986, without the knowledge of the interim military council, deepened the crisis between the National Congress, on one hand, and the military council and other political powers, on the other. The Kokadam agreement, as it is known, which was not signed by certain political powers, including the National Islamic Front and the Democratic Unionist Party, addressed such controversial issues as the state of emergency, the removal of Sharia law, which had been applied in September 1983, and the cancellation of all defence agreements signed with other countries.

The interim government aimed at completing its term and handing over authority to the elected government without triggering further problems, for which reason it chose to avoid discussion of many important issues. The congress, however, sought to achieve maximum gains under the umbrella of revolutionary legitimacy, even if its composition did not reflect the real weight of the political powers present in the political arena.⁽⁷⁾

After the Umma Party took the majority of seats in parliament in the elections of April 1986, the prime minister, Al-Sayyed Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi, dissolved and reformed his government, which he did a number of times during the three-year period of democracy as a result of its inability to deal effectively with the country’s problems. During this period, there were also disturbances within the syndicates and conflict within the general command of the armed forces, which issued a memorandum in February 1989 complaining about the weakness of the armed forces and calling for a change of government and reform of foreign policy.

Al-Sayyed Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi led the first government – known as the national unity government – which included the Democratic Unionist Party, the Sudanese African People’s Congress (Sapco), the Political Assembly of Southern Sudan (Aldo Ajo wing) and the Federal Party. The new government faced several real challenges, though it focused its attention on the Kokodam agreement. It suffered from disagreements over the common defence agreement and the cancellation of the September laws, and also as a result of the weakness of the Democratic Unionist Party. The National Islamic Party, led by Al-Turabi, choose to align itself with the opposition during this period, which allowed it to become an effective player on the political arena thanks to its clear vision and organisation.

In May 1988, a national reconciliation government was formed comprising the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the National Islamic Front, though the differences between them far outweighed what they had in common. The government faced numerous political, economic and social problems as well as increasing military pressure in the south, which urged the three parties to attempt to win the support of Garang. After the prime minister failed to do so in a meeting with Garang in Uganda, the Unionists announced that they had reached a peace agreement, signed by Al-Merghani and Garang on 16 November 1988.

The peace agreement faced several implementation problems. The National Islamic Front, one of the primary parties of the ruling coalition, had several reservations, while an attack on the minister of defence’s jet came as another blow. In February 1989, Nasser City, near the border with Ethiopia, fell into the hands of rebel forces. The minister of defence, Abdel-Majed Hamed Khalil, resigned, claiming that the government was not providing the army with sufficient equipment. On 20 February 1989, the army’s general command sent a memorandum to the government that took the form of an ultimatum. In the same month, a transitional programme was signed by the political powers, the leftist syndicate powers, and the Umma and Unionist parties. The last government of Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi was the united national front government, from which the National Islamic Front was excluded.

At the end of this era, there were two attempted coups. A third attempt, orchestrated by the National Islamic Front, succeeded in toppling the democratic system on 30 June 1989, the third time for Sudan. The leaders of the Islamic Front believed that the army command had applied pressure on Al-Sayyed Al-Sadeq to exclude them from the ruling coalition following instructions from one of the superpowers.⁽⁸⁾

The National Salvation regime (1989-2005)

Although the military National Salvation regime began as a totalitarian one, it later developed, permitting the return of political parties and providing more space for free expression, including criticism of state institutions and policy, which was unprecedented for military regimes in the region. This approach can be attributed to various factors, including internal interaction, division within the ranks of the ruling parties, and pressure from the US, Europe and the Human Rights Commission, which condemned Sudan for violation of human rights. The civil war in the south and deteriorating internal conditions also urged the government to attempt to make tangible progress in other areas.

The concepts of opening up and development were important in the drafting of the constitution in March 1988, particularly as regards respect for pluralism and freedom of political succession. However, a considerable number of parties with representatives in the parliament (1986-89) refused to register in accordance with the political succession law as they perceived that it served to legitimise the regime. This led to the amendment of the law concerning political parties and organisations; they would henceforth be required to register with the general registrar in order to undertake political activities or field representatives in elections. The improved internal political environment brought about the signing of an agreement between the Umma Party and the Djibouti government. In November 2001, as a result of this agreement, Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi withdrew from the opposition group and returned to Khartoum, which had a positive impact on party political life in Sudan as a whole.

The regime then turned towards centralism and federal rule, dividing the country into 26 states – 16 in the north and 10 in the south. Open presidential and parliamentary elections were held in April 1996 and December 2000, though these were boycotted by all but the ruling party and a number of independents.

Following the national dialogue peace conference, which called for the application of a federal system through a comprehensive peace programme, rebel forces attacked the city of Karmak in the Blue Nile region, forcing government forces to pull back until they were able to retake the city on 29 November 1989. These events brought about a change in government policy towards the SPLM. Government forces resumed control over all the regions that had been taken by the movement while peace talks continued between the two sides. The National Salvation Front then undertook to organise a series of campaigns to mobilise students, intellectuals and others to fight alongside the army, forming what was known as the popular defence forces. This led to an increase in foreign opposition to the regime and its declared policy of applying political Islam as the sole source of law, which guaranteed the rebels greater military, financial and political support from outside the country.

Several failed coup attempts ensued, the most important being one led by General Khaled Al-Zein and General Al-Kadru, supported by the Baathists, in April 1990. The National Salvation Front responded firmly, sentencing those responsible to death. The opposition then changed its approach, establishing military camps in Eritrea from which to launch attacks on government forces at the eastern borders. The opposition was supported by the SPLM and the Eritrean forces, the ruling Eritrean Popular Front for Justice and Democracy having declared its solidarity with the armed opposition against the government in Khartoum.

Negotiations between the SPLM and the government faced obstacles as a result of both parties’ intransigence, which led to the failure of the first and second Abuja rounds, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) initiative of 1994 also made little progress. In 1997, however, the government signed the Khartoum peace agreement with a number of southern groups that had broken away from the SPLM. Yet difficulties related to the implementation of the agreement, which stipulated the right of the people of the south to self-determination, resulted in the return of Riyak Mashar and others to the SPLM.

Increasing US interest in Sudan, clearly linked to US oil investments, breathed new life into the Igad initiative while the Egyptian-Libyan initiative was impeded by the conditions and reservations of the opposing grouping. On 20 July 2002, the Machakos framework was signed, acknowledging the southerners’ right to self-determination to be decided by referendum after a six-year transitional period. Sharia would be applied in the north while the south would have the right to select its own form of law. The Machakos framework provided the foundation for the comprehensive peace agreement signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi. However, the gains attained by the south have urged other regional powers to follow suit, leading to the eruption of the Darfur crisis, which was quickly internationalised. The problem is expected to worsen if it is not handled cautiously.

It is expected that a national government will be formed according the comprehensive peace agreement in July 2005, comprising the National Congress, the SPLM and any other political powers that seek to join. This would signal a new phase in the history of Sudan, with a greater portion of authority and wealth being assigned to the south, and with the country being led by a government acknowledged by the international community. However, problems remain in Darfur and in the east of the country, while the National Congress is still seeking to acquire a greater share of authority than it was assigned in the Naivasha agreement.

Political developments

The traditional Sudanese parties were formed without definite ideas or programmes, depending rather on ready-made audiences from two major sects – the Khatemiya and the Ansar. This led to sectarian splits in terms of loyalty and doctrine. Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub stressed, “Our problems started as soon as we got our independence and the sole source of problems was that the parties that supported or opposed independence found themselves without definite goals. The parties failed to achieve any of their goals as they had no detailed programmes for the treatment of economic or social growth-related problems. All post-independence issues were treated separately according to the different tendencies of the parties.”⁽⁹⁾

Military action became the new tool for those opposing the central government in Khartoum, as was the case with the May 1969 authority and the National Salvation Front in 1989. Though victory over the national army is of course not possible for such groups, they are still able to exert sufficient pressure on the government, to create instability and to threaten security in the regions of conflict. Armed popular groups have cooperated with foreign parties in return for financial and media support, internationalising the issue and tying foreign elements to the settlement process.⁽¹⁰⁾

The problem of southern Sudan, which has its roots in the pre-independence era, is one of the most dangerous and complicated in Africa and the Arab world. It has caused several political crises and is the primary reason for the country’s economic deterioration. Civil war has left the ruling system weak, has increased social tension and led to the fragmentation of political powers, all of which has negatively affected the country’s internal and foreign policy. The dispute in the south stems from geographic, historic and political factors, as well as differences in ethnicity and culture, and was nurtured by the sectarian colonial policy of Britain before independence and then by the series of mistakes made by successive national governments. The roles played by some southern leaders have also allowed for western intervention in the internal affairs of Sudan, which many consider will impede national progress, threaten national unity, harm Arab-African relations, and destroy the positive interaction between the African and Arab national liberation movements.

While many consider Sudan’s experiences with democracy to have been unsuccessful, these attempts nevertheless provided glimpses of progress in the political and spiritual fields, represented in the protection of liberties and human rights and the provision of public freedoms. Sudan’s democratic regimes also refrained from establishing special courts and detention centres for their opponents. While successive coup attempts did not provide these democratic experiences with sufficient time to mature, the mistakes of the political leaders can also be seen to have played a part.

Past experience shows that Sudan requires a democratic system if it seeks to solve its problems and prevent its division into warring cantons. The differences between the north and south on the cultural, ethnic, historic and religious levels allow for no solution other than democracy as a means to secure national unity and the right of the country’s various groups to maintain and develop their cultures within the framework of a unified state.

Endnotes

1- Tim Nabluck, Conflict of Authority and Wealth in Sudan, translated by Al-Fateh Al-Tigani and Ali Gadin, Khartoum University Publishing House, second edition, 1994, p208

2- Abel Alier, The South of Sudan and Violation of Pacts and Treaties, p40

3- Mahmoud Abdeen Saleh, Conflict over Authority in Sudan, Al-Amin Publishing House, Cairo, first edition, pp150-151

4- Mansour Khaled, The Sudanese Elite and the Addiction of Failure, first part, p553

5- Dr Al-Taib Zein Al-Abideen, “Democratic Experience in Sudan: Success and Failure”, African Studies magazine, issued by the Institute for African Studies & Research at the International University of Africa, Vol 31, June 2004, pp15-16

6- Salah Mohammed Ibrahim, Crisis of Reconciliation: Chronology of the Third Democratic System in Sudan, first edition, 1994, p43

7- Salah Mohammed Ibrahim, Crisis of Reconciliation: Chronology of the Third Democratic System in Sudan, first edition, 1994, pp49-50

8- Hassan Al-Turabi, Precedents and Consequences of the Sudanese Peace Project, 23 July 2002

9- Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mahgoub, Democracy on the Scale, p77

10- Mahmoud Abdeen Saleh, Conflict over Authority in Sudan, Al-Amin Publishing House, Cairo, first edition, pp157-158

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