George W Bush took office at the beginning of the 21st century. The administration he heads has since made radical changes to US foreign policy. Bush has favoured unilateral action, without due consideration of the visions or interests of his allies, effectively giving credence to claims that the US seeks to establish an empire. This approach has been closely related to discourse of a zealous religious nature.

Many observers attribute the shift in US foreign policy to the events of 11 September 2001, a watershed in US history that called for a comprehensive revision of the foundations on which the US had based its policies. We should thus ask: To what extent was 9/11 the main instigator of these changes? And, more importantly, does Bush’s policy actually represent a radical shift? We should note that during Bill Clinton’s presidency there were unmistakable signs of a tendency towards unilateralism and of the desire to build an empire. Even the missionary-like feature of US political discourse is not a new phenomenon.

So, if US policy has changed as the direct consequence of a unique historic moment or the current power of the neo-conservatives, is it likely to change again in line with further developments? Or does Bush’s policy represent a natural progression of US policy, in which case his policies will remain after he leaves office?

This article attempts to place Bush’s policy within the context of post-second world war trends in US foreign-policy formation, highlighting their historic roots and development, which will allow us to separate the constants from the variables.

The current US foreign policy can be seen as a natural development of an already existing trend under the guidance of an administration dominated by neo-conservative decisionmakers. The events of 9/11 provided the neo-conservatives with all the justification they needed to pass their policies, for which they had been waiting a long time. This does not mean, however, that these policies will die out when Bush leaves office or should the power of the neo-conservatives wane. This trend is the outcome of three decades of neo-con efforts to establish the necessary institutional and intellectual infrastructure to sustain and empower their movement. In other words, the neo-conservatives’ authority is consolidated by the positions they hold, which have enabled them to transform the internal arena and consequently the face of national politics. Analysis of change within the US is thus a prerequisite to comprehension of developments in US foreign policy.

From isolationism to pluralism

After the second world war, US foreign policy underwent a radical shift. Even the decision to enter the war was made at a time when the US was adopting an isolationist approach to world affairs. The roots of this tendency can be seen as far back as the time of George Washington, who warned of the possible negative impact of international alliances on the US. The logic behind the isolationism that dominated US foreign policy was based on an important pillar of US political culture: the notion that thanks to the vast oceans that surround it, the US can shield itself from the problems and complications of the outside world.

However, the second world war marked a turning point as the US was forced to endorse an active foreign policy and to interact with the international community as a superpower with a pioneering role. In this way, the US formed a pragmatic alliance with the Soviet Union – despite their ideological differences – against their common Nazi foes, though this lasted only as long as the Nazis posed any threat.

The US then endorsed a new policy reflecting Franklin D Roosevelt’s desire to keep the country involved in international politics. Roosevelt feared that should the US return to isolationism it would lose all that it had gained through its participation in international affairs. For this reason he backed the establishment of the UN, which embodied international liberalist ideas, mainly the notion that all the world’s nations would be able to achieve their interests through cooperation with each other. Although the US played a vital role in the establishment of the UN, Roosevelt faced a tough task persuading members of Congress that the country would benefit from membership of the organisation. The eventual approval of Congress came on condition of a number of restrictions on the US role in the UN, seen as necessary to protect national sovereignty.

Within the framework of international liberalism, the US endorsed the policy of containment, implemented through the three-dimensional – political, economic and military – Truman doctrine. The economic dimension was represented in the 1947 Marshall plan, which aimed at preventing Soviet expansion by means of attracting more European allies. To this end, the US invested heavily in the reconstruction of those countries destroyed by the war. On the political level, the US provided support to non-communist countries, while military interests were addressed through the establishment of Nato, designed to keep US forces in Europe.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the globalisation of the containment policy as the US applied variations of its three-pronged approach in Asia and Africa. During the 1970s, the US adopted an “accommodationist” policy, though this came to an end in the early 1980s when a new Cold War strategy was devised.

Restricted unilateralism

In 1981, Ronald Reagan brought in a fresh administration that believed in the importance of eliminating rather than containing the communist regimes, thus beginning a new stage in the Cold War. The US offered the opposition in Poland clandestine financial aid. It also increased its intervention in third world affairs directly and indirectly. Prime examples of this policy shift are reflected in the Iran-Contra affair and the provision of considerable financial aid to the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The US military budget increased by 16% in 1981 and by a further 14% the following year, even though Jimmy Carter had previously been keen to reduce military expenditure. The Reagan administration also enhanced the country’s nuclear production systems, again taking a different approach to the previous administration.

The 1980s, then, saw a qualitative shift in the US post-second world war policy, albeit not in the way that Roosevelt had feared. For while the US did not abandon international liberalism for renewed isolationism, it instead adopted a unilateralist approach to foreign affairs, taking a series of major decisions without consideration of its allies.

That said, the extent of the unilateral action taken by Reagan was restricted when compared to that of his successors, primarily because the presence of the Soviet Union prevented the US from antagonising the international community lest its members align themselves with the communists.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the reformulation of the American memory

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the Gulf War that followed had a major impact on the direction of US foreign policy in the 1990s. The collapse of the communist bloc came as a shock for institutions in the US, leaving them in need of a new enemy, indeed a new meaning for US power. US think tanks searched hard for this new enemy, considering Japan and China before after two years settling on Islam, as expressed by Samuel Huntington in his article on the clash of civilisations.

The search for a new meaning for US power became apparent with the Gulf War, which George Bush senior highlighted as proof of what he referred to as “the new world order.” At the time he offered no definition of this term, leaving it open to use by holders of various visions and ideologies. The Gulf War also provided the US with temporary relief from the legacy of Vietnam, which had long plagued the US collective mind, both with regard to the role of the US in general and its military intervention in the affairs of others in specific.

The US military institution has sought never to repeat Vietnam, not by abandoning military intervention but by limiting its cost, especially on the human level. US foreign policy is inextricably linked to domestic policy in that the need to limit its negative repercussions originates from within not outside the US. In light of the lessons of Vietnam, the ruling institution and the military leadership in the US are well aware of the need to curb internal opposition to their foreign policy. This can only be achieved by depriving those opposed to their policies of the support of non-politicised citizens, who generally only pay attention to foreign policy when crises arise that conflict with their beliefs, usually the case when human and material costs are high. This explains also the US interest in military technology of the kind that permits war from a safe distance.

Media coverage of the Vietnam War highlighted a number of US violations of international law, both in terms of the types of weapons used and the treatment of civilians. Subsequent US administrations have thus made considerable efforts to control the flow of information from conflict areas. The skilful use of media technology has allowed the US government to show its citizens events as they unfold – as was the case with the wars in Kuwait and Afghanistan – in a sanitised form devoid of the bloody carnage of real war and infinitely less shocking than the Hollywood version. What the Americans thus succeeded in creating for themselves was an invincible military power at the service of the oppressed of the world that achieves its noble goals with minimal destruction.

In other words, the Gulf War brought about a qualitative transformation in the US collective mind concerning military intervention abroad. The administration of Bush senior was largely able to convince Americans that the use of the army would not lead to repeat Vietnam scenarios. The control of information and subjugation of the media left most Americans unaware of their country’s considerable human and financial losses in the war, as well as of the victims and destruction left in its wake. On the contrary, Americans were given the impression that their country had ascended to the throne with no competitor, and that US military force was being employed to bring justice where it was absent.

The Gulf War thus has an important place in the American memory, and it has since been subject to selective recollection according to the needs of those in power. Clinton’s administration, for instance, drew from this experience the importance of international coalitions.

From selective unilateralism to anti-multilateralism

The Clinton era started with a crisis – the US presence in Somalia – which did not allow for reference only to meanings extracted from the Gulf War. The experience of US soldiers in Somalia led to immediate recollection of Vietnam, prompting a review of the policies of Bush senior concerning military intervention abroad. The direct consequence of this was US reluctance to respond to the genocide in Rwanda and a delay before involvement in Bosnia. It was clear to the US administration that advancements in military technology and control over the flow of information should be accompanied by serious examination of the preconditions to any military intervention as well as the nature of such intervention.

The Clinton administration focused on two key elements: war from a distance and Colin Powell’s strategy of using overwhelming force against accurately defined targets with a clear exit strategy. Since Somalia, the use of air raids has allowed the US to accomplish missions without the involvement of land forces. The Clinton administration also clung to the principle of containment, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, merely substituting the rival superpower with a group of what it referred to as “rogue states.”

The Clinton era also saw a shift towards unilateralism, largely attributable to the clash between the White House and a Congress that two years after Clinton took office in 1992 was firmly under Republican control. The Republicans in congress were dominated by a trend clinging to Newt Gingrich’s theories from the 1970s – a trend different from that traditionally dominant in the Republican Party – which often clashed with Clinton. Their domination of Congress allowed them to impose on the president their own internal and foreign political agenda, which was dominated by antagonism towards the UN. This explains the US refusal to pay its quota of the UN budget as well as the logic behind a number of laws that Clinton himself opposed – including that which stipulated the transfer of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, the Helms-Burton law on the imposition of sanctions against Iran and Libya, legislation outlawing religious oppression worldwide and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 that made removal of the Iraqi regime official policy.

Unilateral stances backed by Clinton’s administration itself include the US rejection of Boutros Boutros-Ghali serving a second term as UN secretary-general and its refusal to sign an international anti-mine treaty. The US under Clinton also launched military campaigns in Iraq and Kosovo without consulting the UN, and undertook military action against Afghanistan and Sudan without forming an international alliance.

This unilateral tendency then cannot be attributed solely to the Republican hold over legislative authority. Another major factor behind it was the absence of a strong international deterrent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which afforded both the Republicans and the Democrats the luxury of unilateralism. The Clinton administration thus endorsed a selective unilateral approach, engaging in multilateral international action when possible but acting alone when it was considered necessary.

In this context, US unilateralism cannot be considered a feature new to the Bush administration; it is just that this approach has now become the general rule rather than the exception, based on animosity towards multilateralism. The neo-conservatives, who have dominated foreign policymaking since Bush took office, are clearly opposed to international collective action. Yet although they are sceptical regarding the possibility of attaining US interests within the framework of multilateral international action or coalitions they nevertheless do not seek to isolate the US. Their rejection of international liberalism is largely based on their belief that US international relations should be based on power rather than equality between states.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the neo-conservatives became more averse to multilateral international action as they consider it an impediment to the formation of a world order that serves their interests. This was the main reason for their antagonism towards Clinton and Bush senior. The neo-conservatives saw the 1990s as a decade of lost opportunities, during which Clinton failed to turn a moment of US hegemony into an era. They believed that the US had the perfect chance to reformulate the world order to serve its interests – as they see them – without any active international power in a position to stop them. One of their prime aims was to enhance US military power in order to use or show it should any party think of standing in opposition.

During the Clinton administration, the neo-conservatives amended the concept of containment to apply to “rogue states.” And, just as Reagan had sought to eradicate rather than contain communism, so the neo-conservatives since Bush came into office have sought to change rather than contain the governments of those states that constitute what it calls the “axis of evil.” The neo-conservatives have even talked openly about the role of the US empire.

From a unique to a traditional empire

The US empire in fact existed long before Bush became president even if its form was unprecedented. Chalmers Johnson in his book The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic described the US as an “empire of bases.” According to Pentagon reports, the US already had 725 military bases outside its territory in 38 countries around the world before Bush took office, in addition to dozens of undeclared ones. US military personnel were also present in some 153 countries around the world, not counting others where covert intelligence operations were carried out.

The empirical spirit is very tangible in the US. The Department of Defence’s role in the drafting of foreign policy has increased at the expense of the Department of State while the role of the Pentagon has increased since the end of the Cold War, since which time the US has engaged in two wars, in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, justifying a growing military budget and increased development and production of weapons. During the 1990s, the Pentagon enjoyed greater freedom as it was no longer pitted against a strong Soviet army and because internal opposition to US military intervention abroad was minimal. The development of technology that allowed military activities to be carried out from a safe distance made foreign intervention more palatable to the masses. The liberals, meanwhile, who had traditionally opposed such intervention, were strong supporters during the 1990s of humanitarian intervention.

The Bush administration introduced to the US version of empire certain characteristics of traditional empires, the most important of these being the direct occupation of others’ territories accompanied by justification of a religious nature focusing on the introduction of civilisation and progress in targeted countries.

From a “city on a hill” to unrestricted absolutes

The world has noted that US discourse during the Bush era has had a decidedly missionary-like religious tone. We should ask, then, given that US discourse has always been of a religious nature, what is in fact new?

Although the US is officially a secular state, as stipulated by its constitution, the separation between state and religion only serves to prevent the declaration of an official state religion. It does not seek to prevent religiosity or ban the role of religion in political life. The US can in fact be considered the most religious of the developed industrial societies.

Huntington has described the US as a “nation with the soul of the Church,” though in this sense Church is not used to mean Christianity but rather what is referred to in the US as “civil religion.” This is a group of values, ideas and beliefs of an intellectual and political nature, though with religious roots, instilled in the US collective mind whose main function is to build a specific image that helps the community to understand and deal with reality.

This framework is based on the notion that the US is a nation chosen and blessed by God and that is has a holy duty to assume in the world. The religious origin of these political ideas goes back to the very beginnings of the US, when the first immigrants, Protestants from England, turned to Puritanism, which they considered would cleanse the Protestant Church of its ills. Many of those who set out for the new world did so to escape religious oppression, hoping to build a new society where Christianity would be purified. They saw themselves as chosen by God to restore rationalism and wisdom to humanity and to undertake the mission of establishing His kingdom on earth.

This fundamental intellectual belief system later became an indispensable part of the political culture of all Americans, regardless of its religious origin. This was expressed in a famous sermon by John Winthrop in 1630, when he described the US as a “city on a hill.” This phrase, based on Matthew 5:14 (“You are the light of the world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid”) implies that the US is both distinguished from all other nations and that it is to provide an example. The US leadership of the world was built on the belief that its role is not only needed, but divinely ordained.

These ideas have been drawn upon during every stage of US history, though specific implications and meanings are highlighted in line with prevailing world conditions. What is consistent though is the exclusion of images that might damage this picture in the US collective mind, such as the genocide of Native Americans, the age of slavery, oppression of minorities and the racism that still exists.

The concept of civil religion has had a major impact on US foreign policy, and can clearly be seen as the reason for the missionary-like tone of US discourse concerning the country’s role in the world. In this regard, the view put forward by some that this discourse is directed externally as a cover for the real aims of US policy is not strictly correct. The nature of US discourse is equally intended for the domestic audience, and has the specific role of appealing to the ordinary American citizen who is put at ease by references to the basic pillars of US political culture. Of course, the political culture of every country is based on contradictions, a selective rather than honest self-image being used to rally citizens behind specific goals.

The most dangerous aspect of this belief system in the field of foreign policy is the absolutes it generates during times of crisis. Whenever the US engages in conflict it is by definition an ethical war in which it is supporting “good.” This explains the use of expressions such as “empire of evil” by Reagan and “axis of evil” by Bush.

What is new is that Bush has rejected the framework of international liberalism in favour of purely religious discourse specifically directed to the religious right that represents his primary electoral base. In so doing he has introduced an element of denominationalism, a feature neither familiar nor acceptable to the average American.

So, although the absolutes of good and evil are not new in US foreign policy, the context has been developed. Bush uses the terms in reference to the ambiguous monster of “terrorism,” against which he has declared war – an endless war against an undefined enemy. These beliefs made it easy for Bush to shift from targeting Osama bin Laden and the Taleban to Saddam Hussein, all of whom, in the context of the “axis of evil,” share the common characteristic of “evil.” In the framework of this flagrant simplification of reality it is easy to talk of the war against evil without mention of its methods of implementation or even measuring its success. The lofty nature of such a war also allows for the disregarding of international law.

Danger from within

The Bush administration has made major changes on the internal level, affecting not only the structure of government but the very foundations on which the American political system rests. The balance between the three branches of power – the executive, the legislative and the judicial – has been altered, with a clear shift in favour of the first. With legislative supervision more or less absent, the administration has taken a tough stance towards the judiciary and the media, allowing it to curb both civil and political liberties.

While these tendencies were clear even before 11 September 2001, the events of that day provided the Bush administration with the necessary pretext to pass into legislation all manner of things under the banner of “protection of national security.” In this way, the administration was able to introduce massive tax cuts for the rich, restructure national security bodies, curb civil liberties, justify attempts to undermine the International Criminal Court, and threaten to withdraw US peacekeeping forces if American soldiers were not granted immunity from prosecution by this court.

Several key figures in the administration, notably Dick Cheney, asserted that the legislative authority had enjoyed extensive power in the 1990s at the expense of the executive authority and that this had to be rectified. The administration set out to achieve this by controlling the flow of information. This was clear even before 9/11 in a number of cases, some of which took the conflict as far as the courts.

The events of 9/11 also allowed for more secrecy. A number of decisions were made without the consent of Congress, and in some cases members of the legislative authority came to know of decisions from the media rather than via official channels.

The administration’s control over information is just one of the tools it uses to keep the US media in check. Other tactics have included the insertion of government propaganda in press reports without mention of its source, payment of journalists in return for defending certain policies, and even the use of plants at presidential press conferences to waste time and shift attention from difficult subjects.

The US judiciary has also come under attack from the Bush administration. The Patriot Act gives executive bodies the right to defer the implementation of rulings, while certain right-wing leaders have even made statements that approach justification of the recent spate of assassinations of judges and their families.

Numerous organisations that exist to defend civil rights and liberties have spoken of the danger of developments under the Bush administration. These internal changes are likely to have drastic consequences. In the short term, they represent the primary factor in the formulation of foreign policy, which is not produced in a vacuum. This is taking place in an environment in which the average citizen is deprived of information, in which there is unprecedented censorship of the media and legislative bodies, and in which alternative views have come to be seen as unacceptable, their holders at best disloyal if not supporters of the enemy.

Bush’s re-election for a second four-year term has provided the neo-conservatives with a golden opportunity to further institutionalise their ideas and influence. Without any symbolic figures in the leadership of the executive institution, the neo-conservatives have managed over a period of three decades to build the foundations of an intellectual, institutional and human infrastructure. They have succeeded in raising and training new generations of supporters, establishing intellectual and research institutions to promote their ideas, creating a space for expression of their views in the media, and making their presence felt in all three branches of government. Their success can be attributed in part to their focus from the beginning on the institutionalisation of their ideas, to a much greater extent than other trends, which enabled them to reach the point where they play a pivotal role in legitimising the right as an intellectual trend.

The neo-conservatives now represent a large trend within the Democratic Party, which allows them greater influence over US foreign policy, and in particular policy towards the Arab and Islamic world, which tops their agenda. The neo-con presence in opinion-making institutions has allowed them to increase public acceptance of their ideas. Now that they are in decision-making positions they are able to leave an indelible impression on US foreign policy.

While this paints a gloomy picture for the future of US foreign policy, hope is provided by the existence of an active and growing social movement that seeks to spread awareness among Americans of Bush’s violations both at home and abroad. Such social movements have always provided the motivation for meaningful change in US policy, as occurred with the movements that stood against slavery, for labour rights, for women, for civil rights, for protection of the environment, against globalisation and against militarism.

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